US and Hong Kong: Best of a Bad Situation

From August 19, 2019

The last article discussed what options are available to the Chinese government vis a vis Hong Kong. I concluded that they clearly have a vital interest in maintaining control, on their terms, in the territory. Any international blow back will be short-lived, whereas domestic authority lost is likely never regained — a development that an authoritarian regime cannot accept.

The US response is less clear. Competing national interests, and conflicts within those siloed interests, makes all China policy surprisingly complex. But many of these choices are simplified if decision makers recognize the imperative described last week that faces the CCP. This IS a vital national interest to the Chinese. No element of the US relationship with Hong Kong is sufficiently important to justify jeopardizing a significant increase in tensions with Beijing — let alone an actual conflict. Instead, the USG should stand aside, and do what it can do diplomatically to mitigate any negative developments.

Instinctively, the US will look at the Tienanmen demonstrations and the international reaction as a guide. But for all the World Historical importance that has been ascribed to that event in the past three decades, Hong Kong has the potential to be levels of magnitude greater. The simple numbers involved — as many as four million HK residents — dwarf any previous circumstance. It also guarantees that any attempt to forcibly restore control will be equally massive in scale. The primary goal of US diplomacy should be to persuade the Chinese not to make that attempt.

But, as argued, if the protests continue, the Chinese have little choice but to choose action. The regime can wait to see if the crisis dies on its own accord. More likely, the demonstrations will continue, perhaps with less enthusiasm but still at unacceptable levels, but the world’s attention drifts to new crises. In this scenario, what can the US realistically do?

Conventional military force is out. Some sort of cyber attack or efforts to disrupt Chinese actions are a realistic option that could hamper but not impede Chinese efforts. These sorts of unconventional efforts are widespread today, even in the lack of a crisis. Efforts to demonstrate the ability to disrupt control systems and communication networks are the modern day deterrence equivalent of SAC having B-52’s airborne at all times. These actions won’t have any actual effect, but it’s something.

Public support for the protesters should be a given. Lack of support for the 2009 Iranian protests is frequently cited, with good reason, as one of the many low points of the Obama years. The prior Administration’s embarrassing efforts to ingratiate itself with the Mullahs in Iran prevented even modest encouragement of a movement that had real popular support in opposition to a regime that was (and is) implacably opposed to US interests. Regrettably, for all his trade bluster, President Trump seems to put a similar priority on maintaining good relations with Beijing, or at least not providing additional grievances. While we shouldn’t make promises, even implied promises, to the residents of Hong Kong that can’t be kept, it is our moral duty to express, at a minimum, sympathy for their plight and support for their positions. We should also remind the world that the protesters are simply standing up for rights they already enjoy, and that the Chinese government is legally bound to respect.

More than anything though, the complex and mutually critical economic relationship between China and US will prevent a serious response. Although trite and simplistic, economic concerns routinely trump human rights concerns. Even in 1989, when the economic relationship was embryonic, it prevented a stern response to Tienanmen. Today’s relationship makes any serious response unrealistic. Look, for example, at the Administration’s inability to place meaningful tariffs on Chinese goods, a reluctance that they themselves admit is due to an unwillingness to make Americans pay more for iPhones this Christmas. And tariffs are a policy that Trump champions and believes to be beneficial (even though his change of course demonstrates that he understands the effects of tariffs even his words indicate otherwise. A topic for another week….)

Never mind that a REAL trade war, let alone any sort of punitive sanctions against China as a whole or targeted at the CCP, could be met by a devastating response further negates the argument for striking at financial interests. Throughout everything, China has continued to buy treasuries and thereby allow the US to foolishly spend well beyond our budgetary means. If that spigot of cash were turned off, the negative repercussions on interests rates and federal spending would be severe and quick. If Beijing went a step further and started selling back those securities, the 2008 financial crisis would look positively benign.

But at the end of the day, perhaps a simple mental exercise will illustrate the doomed nature of trying to impede Chinese actions in Hong Kong. China must view internal threats as an urgent national security threat. The last time the US found itself in a similar position was in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The Bush Administration, with the strong support of the nation at large, determined that there was a vital interest in destroying the infrastructure behind those attacks in Afghanistan. At the time, without question, it was against the interests of China to see the United States attack a sovereign country to affect regime change, but they knew there was nothing they could do, and stood aside. Now imagine that Al-Qaeda had been based in Puerto Rico or some other territory under US sovereignty. That’s Hong Kong.