Ukraine: "Hey, it's Not a Total Disaster."
First in series looking at the state of the world during the Biden-Trump transition
As the nation, and world, prepares itself for Trump II, the new administration will find that there are a number of issues that they will inherit on Day 1. This is not unique, all incoming administrations face issues left behind by their predecessors. What is unique in modern times is a President returning to office after the interregnum of another administration. While we know how Donald Trump conducted foreign policy as President during his initial term, the world has changed during the intervening four year. It is not so simple as extrapolating from the past to predict the next four years, rather there is much that has changed that must first be considered.
This analysis begins with the state of the world at the sunset of President Biden’s term, and the new issues and changed conditions that the incoming Trump team will be saddled with. These include pressing problems that will require immediate attention (Ukraine, Israel’s ongoing post-October 6 operations), those that will likely require attention, perhaps sooner in the term than some might hope (Iran, Taiwan) and those ongoing issues that will require more attention than any administration ever seems to have (Russia, alliance maintenance, North Korea, China, broader Middle East issues, trade, the list goes on…) as well as “unknown-unknowns” that will pop-up inevitably. This article will be the first of several to examine the most significant of these issues – where we are and what options are available (and advisable).
The most pressing foreign policy issue facing the United States today is probably the most significant since the 9/11 attacks nearly a quarter century ago. The repercussions of the outcome, an outcome that is still very much up in the air, will determine the nature of the world in which we find ourselves for at least the next quarter century and likely longer. Not surprisingly, this issue is the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
As we head into 2025 and near the third anniversary of the start of the war, the signs are – at best – mixed. Russia continues to hold large swathes of Ukrainian territory and gives no indication that, despite the loss of perhaps half a million soldiers (likely more) and tremendous amounts of equipment, they are contemplating an end to their aggression. Given the early expectations of a quick Russian victory, the fact that we are nearing the third year of conflict certainly speaks well for Ukraine’s resolve and performance. That simple fact that they continue to fight Russia to an effective stalemate, not to mention that earlier this year they managed to invade and hold some Russian territory is to the Ukrainians’ credit, but the reality is that they face real shortages of equipment and, at a more elemental level, personnel.
The tragedy of Ukraine, beyond the tremendous toll on human life, is that the current predicament was avoidable at several points, and at each of those points the Biden administration chose the wrong path. Their actions (most notably the Afghan withdrawal) earlier in the administration signaled weakness. Their messaging in the weeks prior to the invasion certainly did nothing to discourage Vladimir Putin. From the invasion’s early hours and repeatedly since the administration has signaled timidity and a lack of confidence. Throughout the conflict, and as recently as last month, the administration stated explicitly that they wished to avoid any actions that might provoke Russian “escalation.” Everything that could be done to bring about and then prolong the war seems to have been done, leaving the Ukrainians now at the mercy of a Trump administration that has given them little reason for optimism. As this is an issue of such magnitude, and also serves as an example of the universal shortcomings of the administration’s approach to international issues, Biden’s actions at each of these stages merits examination.
It is gospel in some IR circles that the Biden administration’s ill-conceived, hurried, and bungled withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 telegraphed to bad actors that the US was not interested in foreign involvements that bore any cost whatsoever. MMD is in that circle, as will be discussed in a later article. Put succinctly, this quick withdrawal, without serious efforts to mitigate the obvious troubles that would follow showed that Biden’s consistently ill-conceived approach to foreign policy was unchanged. While one can be certain that Biden’s Afghan policy did not directly inspire Putin to plan his invasion – such planning was likely under way for years – one can be equally confident that it only served to remove any lingering concerns he might have had concerning the resolve the United States to get involved on behalf of Kyiv.
The pre-invasion actions of the Biden administration certainly did nothing to dissuade Russia imminent attack. Most notably, Biden himself stated just a month before the invasion that a “minor incursion” might not elicit a response. Biden and his White House flailed in the subsequent days to clarify, qualify and strengthen this position but the proverbial cat was out of the bag. Putin clearly saw that the US support for Ukraine was qualified, that any belief that there was a unified front was mistaken, and that it was entirely possible that the West might not be either prepared or willing (or both) to respond. Coupled no doubt with a belief in Moscow that the planned action would be clean, quick and decisive, it is easy to see that Putin could interpret this statement as a “green light” to take action.
Administration apologists like to point to the repeated statements in the weeks and months leading up to February 24 that the US had solid intelligence that Russia planned to invade as some sort of deterrent. Indeed, when invasion alarms were being sounded in late 2021, these such statements were cited as critical to the “successful” pre-emption of Russian actions. A more realistic assessment is that they simply showed that the West, and particularly the US, knew that an invasion was imminent but weren’t prepared to do anything to prevent a war beyond making “strong” statements. Obviously, at this point there is no clear record of what was directly communicated to the Russian regime in the weeks and days prior to the invasion. One must assume that, at a minimum, the Biden administration insisted that the Russians refrain from taking action against the Ukrainians, and at the same time hope that stronger warnings were actually conveyed. Regardless, whatever diplomatic efforts were made, they were clearly unsuccessful.
Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence indicating that Biden was prepared to accept the submission of Ukraine was the offer in the early hours of Russia’s advance to evacuate Ukrainian President Zelensky and his colleagues. (This indicated that the administration learned at least one lesson from Afghanistan – get your friends out or look even more ridiculous.) It wasn’t until February 26 that NATO agreed to send defensive arms – primarily anti-tank munitions – to the Ukrainians, and this was only at the urging of European allies.
Having failed to deter the Russians from invading – through indirect encouragement, mixed-messaging regarding US attitudes towards a Russian move, and inadequate warnings in run-up to the invasion – the Biden administration was now confronted with the first major war in Europe in nearly a century (or put another way, since Biden was three years old). It was at this very early stage of the war, the seeds of Biden’s next failure were sowed. As it was becoming apparent to western governments, military analysts and, most notably, the Russians that the invasion was not going to be the quick fait accompli that had been expected, policy makers were faced with dilemma of having to decide what to do. Not surprisingly, the Biden team took the wrong path once again.
As noted above, the US found itself under pressure from normally dovish European allies – most surprisingly the Germans – to take a strong line against the Russian move from the early days of the conflict. NATO transferred anti-tank weapons at the end of February 2022. When it became apparent that the Russians were unable to establish air superiority in the theater, several moves were made to help the Ukrainians exploit this development. In the first week of March, the Germans transferred anti-air missiles to Ukraine. On March 9, the Poles proposed sending several older MIG fighters, a legacy of their Warsaw Pact days, to Ukraine via Rammstein Air Force Base in Germany. Significantly, the Biden Administration blocked this move – calling it “untenable.” Why this move was actually “untenable” was never fully explained, despite the widespread attention given the proposal by the press, and the actual reasons for the decision, in hindsight, are fairly clear.
On the day following the announcement of first transfers of NATO arms to Ukraine, Putin made a public statement that made unspecified reference to the possible use of nuclear forces due to “aggressive statements” by NATO and its members. This would not be the last time that Putin would make statements or take actions which could be inferred to threaten the use of these weapons. Since this first statement, the Russians (both Putin and his government) have continued to openly discuss the possibility of using nuclear weapons, usually in context of responding to actions by foreign powers to “liquidate” Russia. More concretely, the Russian military has frequently conducted exercises involving its nuclear forces and tests of new equipment. In February 2023, Putin withdrew Russia from the NEW START treaty, the last remaining disarmament agreement between the US and Russia. Most recently, in response to Ukrainian missile attacks on Russian territory, Putin announced a change to Russian nuclear doctrine which lowered the threshold for use – rhetorically ominous, operationally irrelevant, but practically effective.
As empty or rhetorical as those steps might be, they did serve a purpose. Biden, and possibly some in his administration, believed them. The administration, when questioned about restraint or refusal to sign on to proposed actions such as the Polish MIG transfer, would frequently cite their reluctance to “escalate” the conflict. Fears that US actions would prompt Russia to escalate the conflict repeatedly placed real limits on what support the US was willing to provide the Ukrainians. Transfers of missiles, Abrams tanks and F-16 fighters are only the high-profile steps that were not taken due to a fear that Putin might “escalate” the conflict. Let us not fail to note that in each of those cases, the Biden administration later completely reversed itself and provided those exact weapons (more on the practical effect of this later) and at no time did Moscow ever actually respond with an escalation – except perhaps in its escalatory rhetoric. But time and time again, Putin would raise while holding a pair of threes. But who can blame him? Because time and time again, Biden refuse to call his bluff.
The result of this timidity served, in practical terms, only to prolong the war. To be certain, there is no way to determine what strategic effect the earlier transfer of these systems Ukraine might have had on the course of the conflict. Or if stronger economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia might have reduced their willingness to continue the war. But it is hard to argue that such actions would have put Ukraine in a worse position, especially if such assistance had come in the early months of the conflict when Russia was strategically and tactically much more vulnerable.
Perhaps the Biden administration did not have confidence in the Ukrainian ability to withstand the Russian invasion, especially in the early weeks of the conflict. This lack of confidence in Kyiv may have led to reluctance to waste material and money on a lost cause and further antagonize Russia for no real practical reason. To be sure, this was the American approach to Hungary ’56, Prague ’68 and even Warsaw ’80. But as excusable as those (in)actions were in their time, none of them ever sat well with America’s sense of itself. While this realpolitik approach might have suited the era of detente and a Kissingerian security policy, there is no other indication that this was ever the approach of the outgoing administration to Ukraine. But however unlikely it is that this was their initial approach, after the failure of the assault on Kyiv and the performance of the Ukrainians over the course of 2022 the administration should have taken time to re-evaluate their approach in real time.
But no such re-evaluation took place. Instead, Biden continued to be stymied by what can only be seen as instinctive fear of Russian escalation. This fear paralyzed his administration from taking the steps needed to assist Ukraine when they would have been most effective. Unlike the Cold War era, when attempts to confront the Soviets were often met with lukewarm or even hostile reaction from European allies, the current alliance is populated by many members more hawkish than Washington. And it is worth remembering that NATO has grown as a direct result of the invasion, with the previously unthinkable accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance. (Of course, further expansion of NATO was another event that Putin said would prompt a significant Russian response. We are still waiting.). But at every turn, the administration has opted for the path of least provocation.
Using the first go-round and his campaign as a measuring stick, attempting to predict what the Trump administration will do in any situation is a fool’s errand. And while I think that the frequent accusations that the once-and-future President is “Putin’s puppet” are both overblown and disingenuous, it is clear that large and vocal elements that form portions of his core support can most charitably be described as “Ukraine skeptics,” while some are nothing less than pro-Putin. President Zelensky’s position would be dramatically stronger if this divide within the American political alignment did not exist. This is another, final and perhaps fatal for Ukraine, failure of the Biden presidency.
President Biden never made the case for Ukraine. He never sat behind the Resolute Desk to tell the nation what was at stake in this conflict. He never explained the steady advance of Putin’s ambition from Chechnya to Georgia to Crimea to Syria to Donbass and what would be next. Never explained that munitions and money now made direct US military involvement in a conflict with Russia LESS likely. No talk about the benefits of a strong NATO. No coldly calculated but accurate statements that Russian casualties made them weaker and the US stronger. No efforts to explain that Russian success in Ukraine wouldn’t just further embolden Putin, but also Chinese ambitions against Taiwan. No explanations that US aid to Ukraine wasn’t bags of cash sent to Ukraine (we only send those to Tehran) which would simply be stolen, but rather transferring aging platforms already in our arsenal. He could have then said that the funds appropriate would then be spent by our government in US factories, generating US jobs, to buy new, modern systems for our own use, but he didn’t. He never told the people any of this directly. He was too scared of provoking the Russians, or being accused of starting a war, or was simply a slave to his own lifetime of bad foreign policy instincts. Regardless of why he didn’t make the case, the nation suffered for it.
In the absence of using the biggest bully pulpit in the world, others filled the vacuum of information. At the outset of the conflict, Americans were strongly in favor of supporting the Ukrainians. The stark obviousness of right and wrong, the lack of any moral ambiguity, coupled with 80 years of antagonism against Russia made it almost impossible for anyone not back Kyiv. But, as time passed, the hyper-partisan political environment led some to oppose efforts to support the Ukraine simply because the Biden administration advocated for it. There is already evidence that the Putin regime paid some outlets to raise “concerns” and “ask questions” about Ukraine, while some other “useful idiots” simply spread Russian propaganda for no better reason than their own ignorance and willful stupidity. Whatever their incentive, these sources helped turn a significant portion of the American population against supporting the Ukrainian cause.
With this change in attitude, it because politically advantageous for some within the political class to adopt these positions. These politicians, not exclusively but overwhelmingly among Republicans, began to oppose the aid to Ukraine – if not the Ukrainian cause itself. Vice President-elect JD Vance most notably said that he did not care what happened to Ukraine. Others “simply questioned” sending aid abroad while we had problems at home, as if the US is incapable of handling two-things at once. As discussed here before, there is unfortunate strain of old style, pre-Eisenhower, Taft Republican isolationism in the MAGA movement. Ukraine brought that to the fore, and it now has a real hold on a significant element of the electorate. Even among those inthe GOP that support Ukraine, this movement has compelled them to be less strident in their support. A strong case made by Biden, not once but repeatedly over the past three years, could have blunted that effect.
It does seem clear that Trump will make some effort early in 2025 to mediate some sort of cease-fire. It is impossible to believe that Putin would agree to any plan that does not, at a minimum, cede vast amounts of Ukrainian territory to Russia. He might also insist on a new regime in Kyiv that amounts to nothing more than “Belarus South.” Ukraine’s bargaining power in such a situation will depend entirely on what Russian territory it holds and what pain it could inflict on Russia in the absence of a cease-fire. Both these conditions have been significantly retarded by the actions of Joe Biden and his team.
To his credit, Biden did loosen the rules on the use of US supplied munitions within Russian territory shortly after the election. Of course, this prompted Putin’s most recent nuclear threat tantrum which, as always, is all-rhetoric and no-substance. With luck, the Ukrainians will be able to strengthen their position in potential negotiations. It also goes without saying that the fact that such a limitation was originally in place was another Biden half-measure. As effective as Lend-Lease would have been had FDR told Churchill that none of the tanks or destroyers being provided could actually be used to ATTACK the Germans.
There should be no doubt that the very fact that Ukraine is still fighting the Russians nearly three years after the invasion began is, itself, a huge victory. The toll on Russian equipment and personnel is staggering and should be enough to silence anyone (short of Putin fanboys and apologists) who questions the utility of western aid to Kyiv. But the fact remains that so much more could have been achieved, including possible Ukrainian victory.
Putting aside counter-factual history, it is clear that Biden’s reflexive timidity has brought about four regrettable facts. Regardless of the costs to the Russians, the conflict has already cost the Ukrainians immeasurably. Additionally, and perversely, the best outcome we can reasonably hope for at this point is that munitions and support will continue to flow, and the war will drag on until the Russians relent, at an even greater cost to the Ukrainians. Thirdly, the prolonged conflict allowed the kernel of isolationism to grow and come to play a real role in US domestic politics. It is likely that that germ was already there, but Biden’s embrace of the war without explaining its importance allowed it to grow. Lastly, he has left the outcome of the conflict in the hands of a new administration whose intentions are, at best, a cause for real concern.
In many ways, the status quo in Ukraine, and how the actions of the outgoing administration shaped it, is an avatar for the rest of the world. As we shall see, the incoming administration will face a number of issues that have been left unresolved by the Biden team. Biden defenders can reasonably say that his actions prevented the collapse of Ukraine. At the same time, he can be criticized for not doing enough to assist Kyiv. Replace a couple proper nouns, and those sentences can be used for a number of other regions.