So Crazy it Just Might Work

As always, Trump's Gaza "plan" should be taken seriously, but not literally.

President Trump’s “proposal” regarding the US assumption of the Gaza Strip is not without merits. I don’t believe it was pre-planned announcement, but rather barely more than an off-the-cuff idea. It is, if not prima facie impractical, then pregnant with a series of unworkable problems just below the surface. But that being said, it’s not without merits.

First, a quick rundown of (just some of) the problems the plan would face if it were to be attempted. It is worth observing that calling this proposal a “plan” is generous to a fault. It is more of a remark, a brainstorm session idea, or a lark than anything as concrete as a “plan,” but we’ll use the term nonetheless. No real operational details were provided. The White House, of course, began walking it back the next day, but Trump then also walked back that walk back. But we’ll discuss what we have before us.

The most notable problem is, to put it bluntly, the Gazans themselves. Not whether or not they would be amenable to this solution, but the simple fact that they exist in Gaza, and Trump’s remarks called for them to not be in Gaza. Therefore, they would have to be removed. (Again, I am not asserting that takes any great skill or insight to identify these complicating factors. I’m simply acknowledging them for the record.) Removing, arguendo, all moral and political roadblocks this remains a practical impossibility. There will be a small percentage that will simply not want to leave Gaza. Even if this number was only a few hundred (or dozens, for that matter), the optics of forcing beleaguered persons from their homes would be intolerable.

But the fact remains that Gazans, uniquely among populations suffering from living in war torn regions, aren’t allowed to leave. Geographically, they could only flee through Israel or Egypt, and neither nation will allow that. Politically, they are already considered refugees and Gaza is their refugee camp. The United Nations created and maintains this unique condition, while simultaneously bemoaning the “open-air prison” that their own actions created generations ago and maintain to this day. Further, absent the actions of these UN protectors, Gaza’s Hamas overseers wouldn’t allow them to leave, as they are useful as either potential recruits, allies or shields and human-props. Lastly, no Arab county is prepared to accept an influx of a new Palestinian population, at least not one of any significant size.

For too long, effectively since the failure of the frontline Arab states to destroy Israel at its inception, the Palestinians have been most useful to the Arab cause as props. As a ready-made population of displaced persons for whom their Arab cousins are simply trying to recover their homeland. The historical existence or non-existence of a “Palestinian” identity in 1948, which is a legitimate intellectual exercise, became irrelevant over the years – there is certainly a “Palestinian” in today’s world. The problem is, to be blunt, that no one wants them. Egypt feels that it already has a problem managing an Islamist element. Jordan, which is already a majority Palestinian nation, is not likely to forget that the PLO under Yassir Arafat tried to overthrow the government and assassinate King Abdullah’s father. Syria has been taken off the board. The Gulf States’ populations would be overwhelmed by any sizable influx, and nonetheless remember that Palestinians supported Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. Memories in the Middle East are measured in centuries.

Apart from the Palestinians themselves being an insurmountable obstacle, the international community will reflexively oppose any such radical change in the situation. Again, removing the unremovable fact of widespread international sympathy, if not support, for the Palestinian cause, there would be strong opposition to the assumption by the United States of an actual interest in the Gaza Strip. Could the US unilaterally assume control of the Strip? Almost certainly, especially with Israeli support. What would be the political cost of such a move? What sort of “green light” would that be for other international landgrabs? Taiwan? Kurdish zones in Turkey? More Ukraines? The question is valid, because such a US move would have to be taken in the face of international protest and diplomatic opposition.

Political opposition will not be limited to the corridors at Turtle Bay and the Hague. Domestic American politics is in chaos, not to put too fine a point on it. About one-third of the electorate has demonstrated that they will oppose anything proposed by this administration, regardless of merit. At the same time, a significant portion of the Democratic party has made it clear that their sympathies lie with the Palestinian cause and have shown no enthusiasm for any solution that falls short of the “river to the sea.” There is a large overlap between these two groups, to be sure, but they cannot be ignored. Add to those groups the isolationist elements of the Republican party, which one must assume would not support the deployment of US assets (fiscal or military) to more foreign adventures, and you will find that any necessary congressional support may be difficult to secure.

But, for the sake of this intellectual exercise, let us assume that those obstacles are overcome or simply disregarded. In that alternate universe of a Gazan population willing and able to relocate and international and domestic political support for the plan, one can see there is merit to the endeavor. As I have written before, the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the truly insoluble problems of international relations. So long as Israel exists as an explicitly Jewish state and there is a population of Palestinians who covet the same territory, there is no solution that will be acceptable to both sides.

The mantra of the “two-state solution” seems only to remain a goal in minds of US diplomats. The Palestinians demonstrated that they have no actual interest in such a solution when Arafat left President Clinton fuming and empty-handed at Camp David in 2000, when the aging PLO chairman was offered everything he could ever hope to obtain for the cause he claimed to champion. Not to mention that Hamas, which tellingly seems these days to speak (or at least act) in the name of Palestinians more than the PLO’s legacy, the Palestinian Authority, explicitly calls for the destruction of Israel and Israelis. On the other hand, a series of political rebuffs, intifadas, and wars culminating in the October 7^th 2023 attack has turned the Israeli body politic decidedly unsympathetic to the idea of any self-governing Palestinian entity, let alone state, on its boarders. The two-state solution, no matter how often it is cited as the goal, is nothing but a panacea. A fantastical idea that, while perhaps a goal of generations to come, is beyond the reach of today’s world.

This is where Trump’s the merit of lies. In world of unmovable obstacles and irresistible forces, something needs to upset the proverbial apple cart. The path that all parties – Israeli, Palestinian, Western, Arab, et al – have travelled since 1991 leads in circles. Circles of violence, false hope, immiseration and futility. To continue these efforts is nothing short of that classic definition of insanity. A proposal so out ludicrously out-of-the-box can be the thing that spills those apples. Despite the prima facie absurdity of Trump’s plan, it might be the thing that causes real change in the region.

If there is anything to be said from Trump’s foreign policy (and that “if” is lifting a good deal of rhetorical weight), it’s that he seems to be bound by no traditional boundaries, and that foreign actors must therefore assume it is within the realm of possibility that he is serious. Despite the fact that his first term was marked by very few revolutionary changes in US policy, he must be viewed as capable of taking radical actions. Therefore, Arab leaders must take into consideration that the US just might try to assume control of Gaza and that it might be in their interest to negate the perceived need for that to happen. Perhaps that means reconsidering support for Hamas. Permitting some Gazans to relocate. Creating their own system to oversee the administration of Gaza (and the West Bank, possibly). European and UN diplomats might reconsider the habit of excusing Palestinian terrorism and moral equivalence that their slavish devotion to the Palestinian cause has made second nature

This is where the Gaza proposal has merit. The unintended consequences of the plan may, just possibly, create an incentive for the parties to look for new solutions, or reevaluate long-standing positions. In the long-run, whether because of this idea or something even more earth-shattering in the future, such reevaluation is the only way out of that circle of conflict.