Iran: Trump Trumps it Up

From June 24, 2019

So I’m worried that my recommendations from last week were taken.

Iran did continue to escalate, and it appeared that they found that line that we couldn’t allow them to cross — that line being one of our pricier surveillance drones. The President was urged to act and agreed to do so. But then he changed his mind, because, you know…. Trump.

(I had a sort of epiphany regarding Trump and where his foreign policy fits in the American tradition — and it fits comfortably — which I will save for next week. Assuming he doesn’t do anything stupid in Asia. Touch wood.)

Somehow, this is the least satisfying response. It shows that Iran where the line is, almost. It shows other would-be adversaries that bluster means nothing (in case they forgot Trump’s initial attitude towards North Korea). It undercuts the national security elements of his cabinet. It shows him to be whatever the bad flavored word for “mercurial” is.

What this shows is that the US doesn’t really have an Iran policy. That policy was, it seems, pull out of JCPOA. Trump, eventually, did that. Thereby he accomplished the one thing he promised to do as a candidate that I supported. Since then, there seems to have been no plan. Perhaps the plan was simply to wait and see how the Mullahs would react. Well, now we know. And that reaction was probably the most predictable available to them. But we didn’t seem to be prepared for it. Or, if we were, Trump seems to not have been committed to it. So before we allow more events to unfold, each of which might compel, or require, a response, the Administration needs to develop a clear strategy.

I’ve got one. Increase economic pressure, while discouraging the Iranians from further attacks. This will ultimately either compel them to return to the negotiating table or, even better, drive the people back into streets and bring down the government. Each of these prongs can be achieved, at least by a disciplined administration.

First, the sanctions must be tightened even further. Iranian intransigence will, ultimately, force the Europeans to act — either to reduce their pressure or increase it. It should be within our ability to keep our allies informed, consulted and on-board. Serious partners could make the difference, but nothing that this administration has done seems to be conducive to such cooperation. Maybe it is time to rebuild those bridges.

Second, discouraging Iran from further escalation must, from this point forward, take the form of military action. Such action must be decisive and disproportionate. It should be targeted exclusively at military facilities, such as Revolutionary Guard bases, air defenses, and naval assets. This will minimize any resulting increase in pro-regime sentiment on the part of the population. Further, these strikes must be carried out exclusively by American forces. While America is viewed favorably by average Iranians, any coordinated effort involving much despised Arabs or the Israelis would be counter-productive.

What is the ultimate strategic goal? Ideally, it would be the end of the Islamic Republic. Going back to storming of our embassy, the Iranians have been the most consistent and intractable enemy we have faced. During that time, they have killed more Americans in combat than any other nation — nearly 1000 during the Iraq war we are now told, and even more if you count those killed by Iranian surrogates such as Hezbollah in Beirut, the Khobar Towers bombing and elsewhere. They are on verge of a nuclear weapon (Thanks, Obama), and the example of North Korea should provide all the incentive needed to prevent a repeat with Iran. For these reasons alone, we should be willing to do whatever is necessary to remove the regime. Yes, anything. But I reluctantly bow to domestic political realities, and accept that we will not be doing “anything.” So, we need to squeeze Tehran until the people go the streets (best) or the government comes back to the table for serious talks that will actually end their nuclear program, not protect it.

There’s really nothing else to say. This isn’t as bad as Obama’s “Red Line” in Syria, but it’s in the conversation. I have been doing a good deal of “President ranking” lately, and find it curious in the space of four administrations, we suffered through possibly the three worst. Pierce (1853-7), Buchanan (1857-61) and Johnson (1865-9) were all horrendous and fell within the space of 16 years. (And to observe that possibly the best President was the odd man out in that string only adds to the oddness.) Similarly, we’re looking at quite possibly the two worst foreign policy administrations taking place successively, (And the chances for improvement in 2020 look slim.)