INF Treaty: Breaking Up is Hard to Do

From March 11, 2019

A few weeks ago, the Administration announced its intention to withdraw from the INF treaty. Such is the state of our political commentary today that there was very little analysis of this decision beyond an extremely simplistic: Trump did it, so it is bad/good. For a couple reasons, nonetheless, this decision deserves more discussion than that.

—

First, on a very basic level, it once again underlines our commitment, as a nation, to the concept of diplomacy, international law, and the sanctity of agreements between nations. While there was and continues to be a great deal of (merited) hand-wringing and tut-tutting directed at President Trump, both before and after his election, at the dangerously ill-considered questioning of our treaty obligations to NATO as well as Japan and South Korea, the INF decision demonstrates that if an administration, even this one, determines that we are no longer served by a treaty, we will withdraw under its provisions as opposed to simply ceasing to comply. This is a direct echo of the “international pariah” Bush (43) Administration’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Note the contrast in behavior with the other signatory to the INF Treaty, Russia. For several years, we have been aware of Russian actions the ran in direct contravention of their INF obligations. Even the Obama administration, to their credit, took note of these actions and notified the Russians of our objection and willingness to take action ourselves. Considering that we are dealing with a bi-lateral treaty the terms of which the other party is no longer observing, it is to our credit that we still feel obligated to formally withdraw, rather than simply ape their behavior and cheat. It is small, but noteworthy, piece of symbolism.

—

Secondly, did the INF Treaty matter anymore? Did it ever?

I subscribe to the George Will School of Arms of Control. Will has said, “Arms control is impossible until it is irrelevant.” This is an axiom that isn’t always true (I would cite the Chemical Weapons Convention as a counter-example), but often is. The INF was born at a time that, in retrospect, was the only time it COULD have been born. Vietnam, Detente, recession and who knows what else left the Untied States of the late 70’s in strategically vulnerable position. The European allies knew it, and we had to face the facts as Brezhnev began asserting Soviet power in places like Afghanistan and Poland. They also began introducing new medium range systems east of the Urals, which placed those European allies the proverbial cross-hairs. To their credit, the Carter Administration recognized this and began a major military modernization program that included the system that would become the Pershing II medium range missile. The target of this missile, so to speak, were those new Soviet forces. Not so much militarily, but as a diplomatic chip that could be bartered.

(One of my most vivid memories of my early teens from the world of international relations were the protests in Europe over the deployment of the Pershing II. Of course I didn’t know in Eighth Grade that the Germans had basically strong armed the US into even developing these missiles, and therefore the irony was lost on me.)

Enter Gorbachev and the last years of the Cold War. MMD is no fan of Gorbachev, apart from the fact that he was man enough to shut the place down without a fight, but that is for another day. Suffice it to say, Gorbachev did recognize the untenable position into which his predecessors had placed his country, and he saw his paramount responsibility as simply preserving the USSR. To do so would require help from the West, not confrontation. Certainly not a perpetual arms race, based on technology instead of overwhelming numbers, which the Soviet system was simply not capable of waging. Eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons certainly would save him money and buy some goodwill, which brought him to Reykjavik in 1986 and to sign this treaty a year later.

The US willingness to sign is easily understandable. Reagan truly believed that smart disarmament made the a nuclear exchange less likely. Domestic politics in the US and in Europe would welcome this move, after years of increasing tension. But critically, the treaty didn’t actually handicap US capabilities. Our force structure was always more reliant on the triad than the Soviets. Moreover, within the triad, ground based missiles were clearly the least important of the three legs to the planners in the Pentagon. Conversely, the Soviets were truly compromised by the treaty, but given the economic and technological hurdles in their path, they were going to be compromised regardless. So it’s easy to say that, in the late-1980’s, the INF really just formalized a situation that was going to happen of its own accord.

But there weren’t any Soviets five years later. And while the Americans could look at a Pershing II and an SS-20 at the Smithsonian and wonder what it was all about, the heirs of Soviets were bound by a treaty as well as the law of unintended consequences...

—

Parte the Third. What changed?

It would be easy to write “Putin” and be done with it. But that isn’t true, at least not in the since that such a simple statement would imply.

Yes, Putin is a Russian revanchist. Yes, he seems to like nuclear backed bluster. Yes, he was forged in the kiln of East-West Conflict. Yes, he seems to have a zero-sum view of most things. And yes, Russia has been cheating on the INF treaty going back a decade. And finally, yes, when pressed on these activities, the Russian response has been that it was in response to the American decision to deploy anti-ballistic missile installations in eastern Europe. (The excuse used for so many Russian apologists for so many things.)

But the anti-missile defenses, which of course were to guard not against Russia but rather Iran, in Europe were scrapped by the Obama Administration in another reflexively anti-Bush attempt to appease Russia (and Iran) — because of course they could handle Putin better. Still, the Russians continued testing and development. Why? Actually, it has nothing to do with NATO or Bush or Obama. Rather, the new wild card is China. As much as Putin likes to bluster in the west, his real threat is China, and he knows it.

The INF only binds the US and Russia (as the successor state to the USSR). China isn’t bound by the treaty. In 1987, this wasn’t an issue. China was still an after-thought in arms control decisions. Their technology was questionable (Yes, the were launching satellites in the 90’s, but they were made of wood.) But of course China is interested in intermediate range missiles. Look at their neighborhood: Taiwan, India, US forces in Korea and Japan. And Russia. As China’s military continues to grow in size and capabilities, Russia remained bound by an INF treaty that applied as much to their eastern flank as it did to their western. Does this excuse cheating on an international treaty? No, but it does explain why.

—

Lastly, symbolism versus realism.

The only thing worse than lack of an arms control agreement is an agreement that only side observes. Like it or not, Russia has effectively been out of the INF for a decade. To his credit, Obama called them on it. (Write that down. I credited Obama for doing something right.) Without a positive response from Putin, Trump has decided to leave as well. Fine. Good and valuable treaties are weakened by every one that is ignored or openly violated. It has, at least for a moment, invited a discussion about modernizing our strategic forces, most of which are in disrepair and rely on five decade old technology. We didn’t fight the Second World War with equipment from the Spanish-American War, but that simplistic analogy isn’t entirely off-base.

Those that lament the treaty’s demise were either personally invested in its creation (George Schultz) or reflexively anti-Trump (almost everyone else). They also value what the treaty REPRESENTS as opposed to what function it is still serving. It is a byproduct of the genetic blind-spot that many foreign policy professionals have for “process.” As I have said before, in an environment such as diplomacy, were real accomplishments are few and far between, simply creating a “process” can be an accomplishment itself. Treaties, which is what happens when process actually leads to something, are the crown jewel and it is easy to see why leaving them is hard to do. But sometimes it’s the right thing to do.