Hong Kong Garden: Can the Flowers Weather the Storm?
From August 15, 2019
(Given the potential significance and differing concerns at work, the situation in Hong Kong is going to be covered in two parts. This article deals with the options currently available to the Chinese authorities. This will be followed in short order by another dealing with the United States’ response thus far and what should happen going forward.)
This year marks the 30th anniversary of 1989 — a year in which two communist empires took two very different paths. Early in the year, the Chinese government cracked down on pro-democracy protests in Tienanmen Square, while later in the year the Soviet-backed regimes of Eastern Europe did not. The fact that the CCP still rules in Beijing and that all the then-Soviet client states are now members of NATO and EU should fully demonstrate the efficacy of those approaches.
Now we are faced with a new pro-democracy demonstration. Again, the target is Chinese government. But this protest is not taking place in the capital, but rather in city that wasn’t even part of the PRC in 1989. And perhaps it is that fact that makes what is going on in Hong Kong, along with a couple others, that makes this situation very difficult for both China and concerned observers.
First, it must be noted that the Hong Kong protests are easy to distinguish from the 1989 protests in Beijing. Apart from the obvious geographic distinction, there is a difference in scale. Estimates put the number of protesters in Hong Kong at two million, a figure that represents fully 25% of the Hong Kong population. Second, at this point, they are not demanding new political or social rights, but rather protesting the possible denial of existing rights. In other words, the are seeking to maintain the status quo, not upset it. Lastly, in 1989 the government could argue that their actions, however brutal, were purely an internal matter. Their conduct in Hong Kong, however, is subject to limits agreed to by treaty.
Given those distinctions, how will the CCP choose to react? It is easy to believe that the authorities are fighting an instinct to crackdown on the protests. It is easy to believe that the survival of the party goes hand-in-hand with a compliant population. This argument is supported by the fact that 1) this has been the policy since 1989, 2) other authoritarian regimes that did not pursue the same course are gone, whereas 3) the CCP still reigns. This syllogistic argument is not based simply on the events of 1989. There have been reportedly hundreds of protests which have occurred since Tienanmen (with growing frequency, in fact) that go largely unreported and are dealt with internally. China pays no price for these actions.
But this is different, of course. Hong Kong is, currently, an open society — especially compared with the interior regions of the mainland. It is, in many ways, the outward face of modern China. These facts, and given that the world is already well aware of the present situation, a sudden black-out of coverage is impossible. Can the government simply “turn off” the internet? Yes. Can the government shut down the airport and effectively cut Hong Kong off from the world? Certainly — the protesters already did that themselves. But what would such actions accomplish? And what would they cost?
Hong Kong’s special status dates back to the handover agreement between the UK and the PRC, in which the Chinese agreed to allow Hong Kong to maintain its domestic institutions (including courts, common law or other individual guarantees). When the handover took place in 1997, the world watched with great interest. This was a time when China was nation still emerging from decades of isolation under Mao. They were only a few years removed from Tienanmen. The debates over trade with the PRC within the US were and annual occurrence. And while the economy of China had already begun its stratospheric rise, Hong Kong immediately represented 20% of Chinese GDP — a figure close to 4% today. For international reasons and domestic economic reasons, the CCP had ample incentive to leave well enough alone in Hong Kong.
Those incentives for Beijing to show restraint are diminished today. China’s place in the world secure. It’s regional role is matched only by the United States, and is being aggressively enhanced. The economic sway China can bring to bear is sufficient to cow other nations into silence over their domestic conduct. This extends beyond just state-to-state relations. International corporations will say nothing to upset their access to Chinese markets and labor, and will exert whatever influence they have over their governments to do likewise. (This reticence, more than anything, demonstrates the hypocrisy of the “woke capital” moment currently witnessed in the US and elsewhere. Corporations so quick to celebrate diversity or “boycott” states with “regressive” laws embarrass themselves by saying nothing about Chinese labor practices and social oppression.) And of course, no serious person would believe for a moment that any Chinese action in Hong Kong, no matter how extreme, would be answered by outside force.
But there are, nonetheless, disincentives to a crackdown. While China seems especially immune to concerns regarding its international human rights reputation, it should recognize that this may be different. Likewise, a hard line response will certainly derail any chance of further rapprochement with Taiwan for a generation. Hong Kong, the government must acknowledge, is unique. A crackdown there will result in capital flight that their flagging economy sorely does not need. As much as any other industry, the financial services sector depends on predictability and the rule of law. It would not be surprising to see similar exoduses of finance could occur from other cities on the mainland. International hubs like Singapore and Dubai came to be what they are today, in large part, to provide safe landings should there be a need to abandon Hong Kong.
Further disincentives can and should be presented by the international community. A crackdown on Hong Kong, given that special status, might (and should) be the bridge too far for some. China’s international partners should make it clear that they will do nothing in response to a hard line course of action. If China expects to sit at the “grown-up” table, these other nations should be willing to hold it to, at least, minimal standards of behavior. The UK, despite the distractions of a new government and looming Brexit deadlines, still needs to step up and demand that China honor its treaty commitments. China’s Asian neighbors might look to increase security cooperation in the face of such a clear expression of Chinese willingness to resort to force in areas where it previous felt constrained. And of course, the response of the United States weighs more heavily than all others’, and will be addressed in the next exciting episode of Monday Morning Diplomat.
This leaves the CCP in an unenviable situation. The demonstrators in Hong Kong are clearly, from their point of view, a threat to the authority of the regime. But acquiescing to their demands can also be seen, for the viewpoint of a authoritarian government, as a display of weakness that can not be tolerated. Further, there is no indication that order can be restored by Beijing using the existing resources in Hong Kong. That said, a crackdown from the outside could easily open a Pandora’s Box. But it might also settle the matter. Of course, the authorities can simply do nothing and hope that the flame of protest dies from lack of fuel. But to carry that analogy a step further, and untended fire might well die, but it might also spread and become uncontrollable.
International censure and condemnation, no matter how earnest, fades in time. The CCP learned that after 1989. Another lesson they learned three decades ago is that any element of control over the population lost may never be regained. Given the choices and risk/reward calculations available to Beijing, the protesters of Hong Kong may find the worst is yet to come.