Brexit: What Did You Expect?

From March 19, 2019

Brexit must be reaching a critical point, because it is actually getting coverage in some US news outlets, despite that fact that no Americans were killed in the event.

I am of mixed emotions on Brexit. First, to plainly state my biases, I am an incurable Anglophile. I view the so-called “Special Relationship,” and its broader embodiment within the US/UK/CAN/AUS/NZ ambit, as the most important strategic fact of the past century. Without it, the Nazi’s would likely have triumphed. NATO would not have been formed. The world economic system would not exist. Show me another example of one global hegemon peacefully passing that role to another. I can think of none.

Likewise, I am not reflexively anti-Europe. I am still enough of globalist Utopian that I see benefits from multi-lateralism and I still smile when I look at the “EUROPE” coffee mug I received in Brussels in 1993. While I miss spending D-marks, I don’t miss Francs. From a less personal perspective, the existence of the EU has certainly played a role in keeping Europe at peace for the past 70 years. If NATO kept the Soviets at bay, the Treaty of Rome did so for the Germans. (And let’s give credit to France. The Third Republic would have created the EEC to isolate the Germans. The Fourth saw the wisdom in tying both nations together as closely as possible.)

But there is a difference between an economic bloc and a continental megastate. And in spite of the similarities of population, economies, political systems and culture, Europe is not the United States. There is too much historical baggage to unpack. Nations and national identities are too ingrained to expect them to be cast aside. Attempts to turn the EU into something greater are doomed to failure. Brexit is a sign of that. The French and Dutch rejections of the Lisbon Treaty ten years earlier were signs. Northern resentment of the south is sign of that. Take an example from US history: Recall how difficult it was to sow together this nation in 1780’s and 90’s. If thirteen tiny, former colonies, sharing a common language, heritage, legal and political systems, and revolutionary experience wedged precariously between an ocean and a hostile wilderness could barely come together, how can modern Europe? The dreams of the Eurocrats will remain just that. Dreams. At least for several generations.

Perhaps a smaller EU could have formed a strong union. Or a weaker union could keep more members happy. But the EU suffers from UN-syndrome. An entity with too many members, with too many agendas and expectations, can’t expect to reconcile all of them. Every individual nation joined the EU to achieve individual state goals. Not one joined with the primary objective to further the European Ideal. It was to protect inefficient farmers, or fisherman, or obtain wealth transfers or cleanse oneself of genocide. (Sorry.)

On the night of the Brexit vote, I glibly observed on Twitter (is there any other way to observe on Twitter?) that it was hard to believe that the British would object to being part of a administrative hyper-state. When I look at that way, I can understand the rationale behind the decision. I admit that I was not too attentive to the argument of the “leave” campaign, since I assumed there was little chance that the campaign would succeed. Remember, this wasn’t too long after Scotland opted to “remain” in the UK. I understood, but didn’t sympathize, with the arguments of Scottish nationalists, and when they failed in their campaign, I only assumed the much less clear case for leaving the EU would fail as well. But when, post-referendum, I looked for the motivating issue that drove 52% to vote “leave,” I couldn’t find it. I should not be surprised that that 52% was a coalition. A coalition that, to be sure, contained an element of political thinkers that saw the role of Brussels to be an ever growing part of daily life, at the expense of Westminster. But it also contained the English equivalent of the blue collar build-the-wall Trump voter, as well as benign nationalists and malign racists. There were also some that simply wanted to “watch the world burn,” as Alfred Pennyworth would put it. But like all too many coalitions, once they achieved their common goal, determining just what it meant became intractable.

(An aside on that growing role of Brussels. It is worth noting that the political hacks who populate the EU parliament seem to be the washed-up has-been’s and never-will-be’s of national politics who, in this country, end up in local and county races about which approximately zero-percent of population care, which allow incompetents, grafters and wing-nuts to thrive. Municipalities can cope with such characters, but it isn’t a good idea to let them run a continent. This is definite drawback of allowing the EU to gain real power incrementally.)

Brexit could have gone well. I think that is what I was, and millions of others were, thinking on that night. I assumed there would be a plan. I also, stupidly, failed to account for EU’s self-interested reaction. Each of those points deserves discussion.

Brexit shouldn’t have been disruptive, at least not as disruptive as it was planned. In my more wistful Anglophile moments back in the 90’s I envisioned the natural expansion of NAFTA to include Britain. Why not? The EU and NATO were expanding. Good international bodies seemed to need to grow. Why confine the new NAFTA agreement to just the three charter members. Sure, it could expand south, but what about east? Britain under John Major was beginning to show signs of Euro-skepticism. They hemmed at Maastricht. They hawed at the common currency. Schengen wasn’t their thing. Why wouldn’t they be receptive to an invitation to join NAFTA? I even came up with a name: Western Hemisphere Agreement on Trade, which was awkward, but would have allowed the Economist to headline an article “WHAT’s afta’ NAFTA?” Clearly, I had mental problems in my mid-20’s, but the theory seemed sound.

Twenty years later, the theory should have still been sound. Britain could have mitigated any losses from Brexit with gains from NAFTA. But the world of 2016 seemed to be turning against trade agreements. No one seems to seriously consider bringing the UK into NAFTA, nor does it seem certain that they’d have been receptive. After three years of sturm und drang associated with getting OUT of a multinational community, it is impossible to consider them joining a new one, even a much simpler one.

The lack of a plan is the most egregious facet of the entire Brexit situation. The analogy of the dog catching the car is obvious, but apt. Not unlike Republicans in 2017 realizing that they didn’t know how to repeal Obamacare, despite their promises, the Brexiteers seem to have thought that leaving the EU would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. An amicable split, not unlike giving notice and moving on to a new job. No, in a world where you need a team of lawyers to get out of a gym membership, leaving the EU was going to be complex, and anyone advocating for Brexit did a disservice to their supporters by ignoring the need for a day after plan.

Perhaps the Brexiteers thought the EU would send the UK off with a smile. After all, Britain seemed to be the odd man out since the days of Thatcher. Special rebates. Taking Masstrihct a la carte. Remaining tight with Americans. Wouldn’t the other Europeans welcome the departure of the obstreperous Brits? On an emotional level, yes. But on another, more accurate, level - no.

EU had to make it hard for Britain to leave. At least insomuch as they would have to make it difficult for anyone to leave. Once the UK sets the precedent of leaving, it becomes an option for anyone. Unhappy with this new regulation? Not satisfied with your share of the fiscal pie? Tired of begin told what to do by those mean Germans? Just threaten to leave. Or just leave without the threat. Britain did it, why can’t we? Unwilling to face that future, Britian’s soon to be ex-partners determined that Britain was going to pay, and pay hard. Any nation that ever looks to leaving the EU in the future will know that Brussels will get that pound (or two) of flesh. The fact that this stance was payback for all those years of English stubbornness as well a reasonable in terms of insuring self-preservation only sweetened the pot.

So what we seem to be left with, after more than two years of hand-wringing, is what? The Conservatives seem to be even more divided than before. One Tory government was destroyed by the vote they themselves produced, and another seems to be able to survive only because the party is incapable of selecting a new one. The Europeans are only too happy to provide exactly enough help to make the situation even more tragic. But, of course, given the vagaries of the Brexit issue, turning to the opposition does not mean a renunciation of Brexit, or even a new referendum. There can little doubt that, if nothing else, Brexit had bought the UK perilously close to a Corbyn Premiership. That alone should sober up the minds of the Tories and anyone else who cares about the future of Britain (in or out of Europe) and focus their efforts on getting a deal and moving forward. But this tragic comedy of errors, it seems, is not yet done with that Island Nation.