I didn’t write the piece. It wouldn’t have been wrong, and it would have accurately reflected my thoughts, but I wanted time to reflect. I wanted to see if I was missing something. Some argument that would make that event – the most cringe-inducing event I’ve ever seen in the White House – make sense. Put simply, nothing heard or read was able to put forth a conclusive argument that reconciled what I saw with a sound, pro-Ukrainian, policy. What I encountered, however, discouraged me in a whole different way.

Too few have wanted to argue the implications of the row on actual Ukrainian policy. Most analysis chose to look at the event through a lens of domestic politics. That this would have happened should have been so obvious that I am ashamed that I didn’t expect it going in. The embroglio was either the fault of a rude and inappreciative Ukrainian stooge showing disrespect to the United States, or it was an ambush by the pro-Russia Putin-puppet Donald Trump and his attack dog JD Vance. The media coverage and excepted video certainly supported the later, and that has become the main narrative.

I will not take issue with that interpretation. The behavior of the President and Vice President were, in the end, embarrassing. As I watched the event on Friday, my immediate suspicion was that this was a set-up. An elaborate effort to summon Zelensky to Washington in order, simply, to embarrass him and, by extension, the Ukrainian cause. I no longer believe this was a set-up, at least not one that Trump was involved in. The press event had proceeded for over 30 minutes before it fell apart. Trump was, in his own self-congratulatory way, complementary of Ukraine and seemed to be in support of continued assistance and their goals to regain lost territory. He had his minerals deal, as the symbolic totem of his victory, and that seemed to be what was important to him.

While I give a pass to Trump, I am not so willing to do so for Vance. His repeated past statements regarding Ukraine show that he does not support the cause. He is clearly ingratiating himself with that portion of the right that, expressly or not, admires Putin’s Russia for whatever reasons. At best, I will say that Vance did not intend to use this event as an opportunity to attack Zelensky. Had he planned such a move, he would have done so much earlier. But his is not so much of a man that he could pass up the opportunity when Zelensky finally gave it to him. He attacked, and he more than likely knew that if Zelensky responded, it would be just the sort of provocation that Trump’s lizard brain couldn’t ignore. And that’s what happened, and that’s the reason why we’re here.

At least, it’s part of the reason. As they say, it takes two (in this case, three) to tango. One of my core beliefs is that people have agency. With the occasional exception of obstinate princelings who inherit their positions through the accident of birth, those who rise to become players on the world stage possess self-awareness and, to succeed, must display self-control. As one of the principals in that room, Zelensky must take some of the blame. No one going into a meeting with Donald Trump in 2025 should have any illusions about what to expect. He will ramble. He will boast. He will make wild, exaggerated claims. He will misstate facts, both intentionally and through ignorance. He will make himself into the subject of every question, statement, event, etc. Anyone who disputes his statements or challenges him will not be met halfway. This is what he does. I do not excuse this behavior, nor do I in anyway admire it. But it is part of what makes Trump the man that he is, and it excites his supporters as much as it baffles and angers his opponents. Nonetheless, for good or bad, right or wrong, it is a fact and must be recognized as such.

Zelensky did not appreciate that reality. As demeaning or insulting as it may be, he needed to realize that a public event with Trump is something to be endured. No matter what inanities were spewed by his host, Zelensky needed to sit there and smile. He didn’t do that, despite the fact that it was absolutely in his interest to have done so. Maybe he was exhausted after the marathon session. Maybe his command of English, as good as it is, failed him at that moment. “Maybe” any number of things. The point is, he should have bit his lip and sat there while Trump continued to talk. He should have watched the Netanyahu press conference and studied the Israeli PM stand there quietly while Trump extolled the paradise that he was going to make of Gaza. But Zelensky didn’t.

Part of this, no doubt, was poor preparation. If one can believe the statements of some who were Zelensky’s meeting with members of Congress prior to the White House event, he was reminded to play the dutiful supplicant to Trump. His personal staff should have reinforced this. His ambassador, her face now famously buried in her hands, should have instilled this in his mind. There should have been translators on hand, not just to ensure that language was precise but also provide a brief cooling-off moment. Someone on either staff – perhaps even Secretary Rubio or Zelensky himself – should have had the presence of mind to simply say that the public event had gone on long enough and it was time to move on to actual point of the visit.

Failing to do this, and it pains me to say this, Zelensky should have apologized. Maybe the language barrier kept him from immediately grasping this in the moment of the rapid-fire blame-game. But the moment he left the White House he should have realized this. And if he is too proud or too (understandably) certain of his cause, he still should have had the self-awareness to realize that an apology, no matter how tightly his teeth were clinched, was required. But he didn’t. And if his staff didn’t explain this to him, they failed him inexcusably. Hours later, he went on Fox News and was asked repeatedly by Brett Baier – an interviewer that is, by all indications sympathetic to Ukraine’s cause – if he was prepared to apologize or give the thanks that he was accused of not expressing and he refused to do so. It doesn’t matter that he has expressed gratitude many times in the past, Trump demanded that he do so again. And he should have realized that he needed to do so, and he didn’t.

I get it. It sucks. Even children hate apologizing for things that aren’t their fault. But adults realize that, sometimes it’s what has to be done. World leaders, especially those that are fighting for the very survival of their nation, have sometimes to make compromises with their consciences to achieve goals. This is an integral part of real diplomacy. Enough people have spoken to Zelensky in the ensuing days that he now has no excuse not to realize that this is the fact. He has to realize that securing the support of Trump is essential to survival of his country, and that will only come about through horrible contrition. Trump, like most Americans, doesn’t care that much and has already moved on to Congressional addresses and antagonizing trade partners and the markets. No one in the Administration who might want to argue Zelensky’s case is going to do so at this point. There is no European cavalry that can provide the material he needs. Only he possesses what is needed to secure his goal, and it will cost him his pride. Pride is a luxury that leaders up against the proverbial wall can’t always afford. Speaking of supporting Stalin in the wake of Operation Barbarossa, no less a pride filled person as Churchill famously said, “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.”

Not one word of what I write here is meant to qualify or excuse the policy of the Trump Administration vis a vis Russia and Ukraine. A responsible, intelligent administration would see that Ukraine’s cause and American geopolitical interests are completely in line. As I have written before, there is no serious downside to providing whatever aid the Ukrainians can use against the Russians. But the road the world takes if Russia prevails is strewn with destinations. Is sending aid for Ukraine worse than sending marines to die in Estonia? Who can seriously argue that it is? But of course, the Vance’s of this Administration will argue that we don’t have to send those troops, and they’ll probably prevail. And Putin knows that.

The imperative that Ukraine win (or at the very least that Russia, by its own measure, lose) this conflict is so great, so obvious, that I don’t feel it can be adequately expressed through words. Given the likely choices that the Trump Administration will make and the amount of time left to it, there is too much that can be irrevocably damaged as a result of Ukraine’s defeat. If that means the Zelensky has to praise the Devil, then he should do so.

First, a quick rundown of (just some of) the problems the plan would face if it were to be attempted. It is worth observing that calling this proposal a “plan” is generous to a fault. It is more of a remark, a brainstorm session idea, or a lark than anything as concrete as a “plan,” but we’ll use the term nonetheless. No real operational details were provided. The White House, of course, began walking it back the next day, but Trump then also walked back that walk back. But we’ll discuss what we have before us.

The most notable problem is, to put it bluntly, the Gazans themselves. Not whether or not they would be amenable to this solution, but the simple fact that they exist in Gaza, and Trump’s remarks called for them to not be in Gaza. Therefore, they would have to be removed. (Again, I am not asserting that takes any great skill or insight to identify these complicating factors. I’m simply acknowledging them for the record.) Removing, arguendo, all moral and political roadblocks this remains a practical impossibility. There will be a small percentage that will simply not want to leave Gaza. Even if this number was only a few hundred (or dozens, for that matter), the optics of forcing beleaguered persons from their homes would be intolerable.

But the fact remains that Gazans, uniquely among populations suffering from living in war torn regions, aren’t allowed to leave. Geographically, they could only flee through Israel or Egypt, and neither nation will allow that. Politically, they are already considered refugees and Gaza is their refugee camp. The United Nations created and maintains this unique condition, while simultaneously bemoaning the “open-air prison” that their own actions created generations ago and maintain to this day. Further, absent the actions of these UN protectors, Gaza’s Hamas overseers wouldn’t allow them to leave, as they are useful as either potential recruits, allies or shields and human-props. Lastly, no Arab county is prepared to accept an influx of a new Palestinian population, at least not one of any significant size.

For too long, effectively since the failure of the frontline Arab states to destroy Israel at its inception, the Palestinians have been most useful to the Arab cause as props. As a ready-made population of displaced persons for whom their Arab cousins are simply trying to recover their homeland. The historical existence or non-existence of a “Palestinian” identity in 1948, which is a legitimate intellectual exercise, became irrelevant over the years – there is certainly a “Palestinian” in today’s world. The problem is, to be blunt, that no one wants them. Egypt feels that it already has a problem managing an Islamist element. Jordan, which is already a majority Palestinian nation, is not likely to forget that the PLO under Yassir Arafat tried to overthrow the government and assassinate King Abdullah’s father. Syria has been taken off the board. The Gulf States’ populations would be overwhelmed by any sizable influx, and nonetheless remember that Palestinians supported Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. Memories in the Middle East are measured in centuries.

Apart from the Palestinians themselves being an insurmountable obstacle, the international community will reflexively oppose any such radical change in the situation. Again, removing the unremovable fact of widespread international sympathy, if not support, for the Palestinian cause, there would be strong opposition to the assumption by the United States of an actual interest in the Gaza Strip. Could the US unilaterally assume control of the Strip? Almost certainly, especially with Israeli support. What would be the political cost of such a move? What sort of “green light” would that be for other international landgrabs? Taiwan? Kurdish zones in Turkey? More Ukraines? The question is valid, because such a US move would have to be taken in the face of international protest and diplomatic opposition.

Political opposition will not be limited to the corridors at Turtle Bay and the Hague. Domestic American politics is in chaos, not to put too fine a point on it. About one-third of the electorate has demonstrated that they will oppose anything proposed by this administration, regardless of merit. At the same time, a significant portion of the Democratic party has made it clear that their sympathies lie with the Palestinian cause and have shown no enthusiasm for any solution that falls short of the “river to the sea.” There is a large overlap between these two groups, to be sure, but they cannot be ignored. Add to those groups the isolationist elements of the Republican party, which one must assume would not support the deployment of US assets (fiscal or military) to more foreign adventures, and you will find that any necessary congressional support may be difficult to secure.

But, for the sake of this intellectual exercise, let us assume that those obstacles are overcome or simply disregarded. In that alternate universe of a Gazan population willing and able to relocate and international and domestic political support for the plan, one can see there is merit to the endeavor. As I have written before, the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the truly insoluble problems of international relations. So long as Israel exists as an explicitly Jewish state and there is a population of Palestinians who covet the same territory, there is no solution that will be acceptable to both sides.

The mantra of the “two-state solution” seems only to remain a goal in minds of US diplomats. The Palestinians demonstrated that they have no actual interest in such a solution when Arafat left President Clinton fuming and empty-handed at Camp David in 2000, when the aging PLO chairman was offered everything he could ever hope to obtain for the cause he claimed to champion. Not to mention that Hamas, which tellingly seems these days to speak (or at least act) in the name of Palestinians more than the PLO’s legacy, the Palestinian Authority, explicitly calls for the destruction of Israel and Israelis. On the other hand, a series of political rebuffs, intifadas, and wars culminating in the October 7^th 2023 attack has turned the Israeli body politic decidedly unsympathetic to the idea of any self-governing Palestinian entity, let alone state, on its boarders. The two-state solution, no matter how often it is cited as the goal, is nothing but a panacea. A fantastical idea that, while perhaps a goal of generations to come, is beyond the reach of today’s world.

This is where Trump’s the merit of lies. In world of unmovable obstacles and irresistible forces, something needs to upset the proverbial apple cart. The path that all parties – Israeli, Palestinian, Western, Arab, et al – have travelled since 1991 leads in circles. Circles of violence, false hope, immiseration and futility. To continue these efforts is nothing short of that classic definition of insanity. A proposal so out ludicrously out-of-the-box can be the thing that spills those apples. Despite the prima facie absurdity of Trump’s plan, it might be the thing that causes real change in the region.

If there is anything to be said from Trump’s foreign policy (and that “if” is lifting a good deal of rhetorical weight), it’s that he seems to be bound by no traditional boundaries, and that foreign actors must therefore assume it is within the realm of possibility that he is serious. Despite the fact that his first term was marked by very few revolutionary changes in US policy, he must be viewed as capable of taking radical actions. Therefore, Arab leaders must take into consideration that the US just might try to assume control of Gaza and that it might be in their interest to negate the perceived need for that to happen. Perhaps that means reconsidering support for Hamas. Permitting some Gazans to relocate. Creating their own system to oversee the administration of Gaza (and the West Bank, possibly). European and UN diplomats might reconsider the habit of excusing Palestinian terrorism and moral equivalence that their slavish devotion to the Palestinian cause has made second nature

This is where the Gaza proposal has merit. The unintended consequences of the plan may, just possibly, create an incentive for the parties to look for new solutions, or reevaluate long-standing positions. In the long-run, whether because of this idea or something even more earth-shattering in the future, such reevaluation is the only way out of that circle of conflict.

This analysis begins with the state of the world at the sunset of President Biden’s term, and the new issues and changed conditions that the incoming Trump team will be saddled with. These include pressing problems that will require immediate attention (Ukraine, Israel’s ongoing post-October 6 operations), those that will likely require attention, perhaps sooner in the term than some might hope (Iran, Taiwan) and those ongoing issues that will require more attention than any administration ever seems to have (Russia, alliance maintenance, North Korea, China, broader Middle East issues, trade, the list goes on…) as well as “unknown-unknowns” that will pop-up inevitably. This article will be the first of several to examine the most significant of these issues – where we are and what options are available (and advisable).

The most pressing foreign policy issue facing the United States today is probably the most significant since the 9/11 attacks nearly a quarter century ago. The repercussions of the outcome, an outcome that is still very much up in the air, will determine the nature of the world in which we find ourselves for at least the next quarter century and likely longer. Not surprisingly, this issue is the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

As we head into 2025 and near the third anniversary of the start of the war, the signs are – at best – mixed. Russia continues to hold large swathes of Ukrainian territory and gives no indication that, despite the loss of perhaps half a million soldiers (likely more) and tremendous amounts of equipment, they are contemplating an end to their aggression. Given the early expectations of a quick Russian victory, the fact that we are nearing the third year of conflict certainly speaks well for Ukraine’s resolve and performance. That simple fact that they continue to fight Russia to an effective stalemate, not to mention that earlier this year they managed to invade and hold some Russian territory is to the Ukrainians’ credit, but the reality is that they face real shortages of equipment and, at a more elemental level, personnel.

The tragedy of Ukraine, beyond the tremendous toll on human life, is that the current predicament was avoidable at several points, and at each of those points the Biden administration chose the wrong path. Their actions (most notably the Afghan withdrawal) earlier in the administration signaled weakness. Their messaging in the weeks prior to the invasion certainly did nothing to discourage Vladimir Putin. From the invasion’s early hours and repeatedly since the administration has signaled timidity and a lack of confidence. Throughout the conflict, and as recently as last month, the administration stated explicitly that they wished to avoid any actions that might provoke Russian “escalation.” Everything that could be done to bring about and then prolong the war seems to have been done, leaving the Ukrainians now at the mercy of a Trump administration that has given them little reason for optimism. As this is an issue of such magnitude, and also serves as an example of the universal shortcomings of the administration’s approach to international issues, Biden’s actions at each of these stages merits examination.

It is gospel in some IR circles that the Biden administration’s ill-conceived, hurried, and bungled withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 telegraphed to bad actors that the US was not interested in foreign involvements that bore any cost whatsoever. MMD is in that circle, as will be discussed in a later article. Put succinctly, this quick withdrawal, without serious efforts to mitigate the obvious troubles that would follow showed that Biden’s consistently ill-conceived approach to foreign policy was unchanged. While one can be certain that Biden’s Afghan policy did not directly inspire Putin to plan his invasion – such planning was likely under way for years – one can be equally confident that it only served to remove any lingering concerns he might have had concerning the resolve the United States to get involved on behalf of Kyiv.

The pre-invasion actions of the Biden administration certainly did nothing to dissuade Russia imminent attack. Most notably, Biden himself stated just a month before the invasion that a “minor incursion” might not elicit a response. Biden and his White House flailed in the subsequent days to clarify, qualify and strengthen this position but the proverbial cat was out of the bag. Putin clearly saw that the US support for Ukraine was qualified, that any belief that there was a unified front was mistaken, and that it was entirely possible that the West might not be either prepared or willing (or both) to respond. Coupled no doubt with a belief in Moscow that the planned action would be clean, quick and decisive, it is easy to see that Putin could interpret this statement as a “green light” to take action.

Administration apologists like to point to the repeated statements in the weeks and months leading up to February 24 that the US had solid intelligence that Russia planned to invade as some sort of deterrent. Indeed, when invasion alarms were being sounded in late 2021, these such statements were cited as critical to the “successful” pre-emption of Russian actions. A more realistic assessment is that they simply showed that the West, and particularly the US, knew that an invasion was imminent but weren’t prepared to do anything to prevent a war beyond making “strong” statements. Obviously, at this point there is no clear record of what was directly communicated to the Russian regime in the weeks and days prior to the invasion. One must assume that, at a minimum, the Biden administration insisted that the Russians refrain from taking action against the Ukrainians, and at the same time hope that stronger warnings were actually conveyed. Regardless, whatever diplomatic efforts were made, they were clearly unsuccessful.

Perhaps the most telling piece of evidence indicating that Biden was prepared to accept the submission of Ukraine was the offer in the early hours of Russia’s advance to evacuate Ukrainian President Zelensky and his colleagues. (This indicated that the administration learned at least one lesson from Afghanistan – get your friends out or look even more ridiculous.) It wasn’t until February 26 that NATO agreed to send defensive arms – primarily anti-tank munitions – to the Ukrainians, and this was only at the urging of European allies.

Having failed to deter the Russians from invading – through indirect encouragement, mixed-messaging regarding US attitudes towards a Russian move, and inadequate warnings in run-up to the invasion – the Biden administration was now confronted with the first major war in Europe in nearly a century (or put another way, since Biden was three years old). It was at this very early stage of the war, the seeds of Biden’s next failure were sowed. As it was becoming apparent to western governments, military analysts and, most notably, the Russians that the invasion was not going to be the quick fait accompli that had been expected, policy makers were faced with dilemma of having to decide what to do. Not surprisingly, the Biden team took the wrong path once again.

As noted above, the US found itself under pressure from normally dovish European allies – most surprisingly the Germans – to take a strong line against the Russian move from the early days of the conflict. NATO transferred anti-tank weapons at the end of February 2022. When it became apparent that the Russians were unable to establish air superiority in the theater, several moves were made to help the Ukrainians exploit this development. In the first week of March, the Germans transferred anti-air missiles to Ukraine. On March 9, the Poles proposed sending several older MIG fighters, a legacy of their Warsaw Pact days, to Ukraine via Rammstein Air Force Base in Germany. Significantly, the Biden Administration blocked this move – calling it “untenable.” Why this move was actually “untenable” was never fully explained, despite the widespread attention given the proposal by the press, and the actual reasons for the decision, in hindsight, are fairly clear.

On the day following the announcement of first transfers of NATO arms to Ukraine, Putin made a public statement that made unspecified reference to the possible use of nuclear forces due to “aggressive statements” by NATO and its members. This would not be the last time that Putin would make statements or take actions which could be inferred to threaten the use of these weapons. Since this first statement, the Russians (both Putin and his government) have continued to openly discuss the possibility of using nuclear weapons, usually in context of responding to actions by foreign powers to “liquidate” Russia. More concretely, the Russian military has frequently conducted exercises involving its nuclear forces and tests of new equipment. In February 2023, Putin withdrew Russia from the NEW START treaty, the last remaining disarmament agreement between the US and Russia. Most recently, in response to Ukrainian missile attacks on Russian territory, Putin announced a change to Russian nuclear doctrine which lowered the threshold for use – rhetorically ominous, operationally irrelevant, but practically effective.

As empty or rhetorical as those steps might be, they did serve a purpose. Biden, and possibly some in his administration, believed them. The administration, when questioned about restraint or refusal to sign on to proposed actions such as the Polish MIG transfer, would frequently cite their reluctance to “escalate” the conflict. Fears that US actions would prompt Russia to escalate the conflict repeatedly placed real limits on what support the US was willing to provide the Ukrainians. Transfers of missiles, Abrams tanks and F-16 fighters are only the high-profile steps that were not taken due to a fear that Putin might “escalate” the conflict. Let us not fail to note that in each of those cases, the Biden administration later completely reversed itself and provided those exact weapons (more on the practical effect of this later) and at no time did Moscow ever actually respond with an escalation – except perhaps in its escalatory rhetoric. But time and time again, Putin would raise while holding a pair of threes. But who can blame him? Because time and time again, Biden refuse to call his bluff.

The result of this timidity served, in practical terms, only to prolong the war. To be certain, there is no way to determine what strategic effect the earlier transfer of these systems Ukraine might have had on the course of the conflict. Or if stronger economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia might have reduced their willingness to continue the war. But it is hard to argue that such actions would have put Ukraine in a worse position, especially if such assistance had come in the early months of the conflict when Russia was strategically and tactically much more vulnerable.

Perhaps the Biden administration did not have confidence in the Ukrainian ability to withstand the Russian invasion, especially in the early weeks of the conflict. This lack of confidence in Kyiv may have led to reluctance to waste material and money on a lost cause and further antagonize Russia for no real practical reason. To be sure, this was the American approach to Hungary ’56, Prague ’68 and even Warsaw ’80. But as excusable as those (in)actions were in their time, none of them ever sat well with America’s sense of itself. While this realpolitik approach might have suited the era of detente and a Kissingerian security policy, there is no other indication that this was ever the approach of the outgoing administration to Ukraine. But however unlikely it is that this was their initial approach, after the failure of the assault on Kyiv and the performance of the Ukrainians over the course of 2022 the administration should have taken time to re-evaluate their approach in real time.

But no such re-evaluation took place. Instead, Biden continued to be stymied by what can only be seen as instinctive fear of Russian escalation. This fear paralyzed his administration from taking the steps needed to assist Ukraine when they would have been most effective. Unlike the Cold War era, when attempts to confront the Soviets were often met with lukewarm or even hostile reaction from European allies, the current alliance is populated by many members more hawkish than Washington. And it is worth remembering that NATO has grown as a direct result of the invasion, with the previously unthinkable accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance. (Of course, further expansion of NATO was another event that Putin said would prompt a significant Russian response. We are still waiting.). But at every turn, the administration has opted for the path of least provocation.

Using the first go-round and his campaign as a measuring stick, attempting to predict what the Trump administration will do in any situation is a fool’s errand. And while I think that the frequent accusations that the once-and-future President is “Putin’s puppet” are both overblown and disingenuous, it is clear that large and vocal elements that form portions of his core support can most charitably be described as “Ukraine skeptics,” while some are nothing less than pro-Putin. President Zelensky’s position would be dramatically stronger if this divide within the American political alignment did not exist. This is another, final and perhaps fatal for Ukraine, failure of the Biden presidency.

President Biden never made the case for Ukraine. He never sat behind the Resolute Desk to tell the nation what was at stake in this conflict. He never explained the steady advance of Putin’s ambition from Chechnya to Georgia to Crimea to Syria to Donbass and what would be next. Never explained that munitions and money now made direct US military involvement in a conflict with Russia LESS likely. No talk about the benefits of a strong NATO. No coldly calculated but accurate statements that Russian casualties made them weaker and the US stronger. No efforts to explain that Russian success in Ukraine wouldn’t just further embolden Putin, but also Chinese ambitions against Taiwan. No explanations that US aid to Ukraine wasn’t bags of cash sent to Ukraine (we only send those to Tehran) which would simply be stolen, but rather transferring aging platforms already in our arsenal. He could have then said that the funds appropriate would then be spent by our government in US factories, generating US jobs, to buy new, modern systems for our own use, but he didn’t. He never told the people any of this directly. He was too scared of provoking the Russians, or being accused of starting a war, or was simply a slave to his own lifetime of bad foreign policy instincts. Regardless of why he didn’t make the case, the nation suffered for it.

In the absence of using the biggest bully pulpit in the world, others filled the vacuum of information. At the outset of the conflict, Americans were strongly in favor of supporting the Ukrainians. The stark obviousness of right and wrong, the lack of any moral ambiguity, coupled with 80 years of antagonism against Russia made it almost impossible for anyone not back Kyiv. But, as time passed, the hyper-partisan political environment led some to oppose efforts to support the Ukraine simply because the Biden administration advocated for it. There is already evidence that the Putin regime paid some outlets to raise “concerns” and “ask questions” about Ukraine, while some other “useful idiots” simply spread Russian propaganda for no better reason than their own ignorance and willful stupidity. Whatever their incentive, these sources helped turn a significant portion of the American population against supporting the Ukrainian cause.

With this change in attitude, it because politically advantageous for some within the political class to adopt these positions. These politicians, not exclusively but overwhelmingly among Republicans, began to oppose the aid to Ukraine – if not the Ukrainian cause itself. Vice President-elect JD Vance most notably said that he did not care what happened to Ukraine. Others “simply questioned” sending aid abroad while we had problems at home, as if the US is incapable of handling two-things at once. As discussed here before, there is unfortunate strain of old style, pre-Eisenhower, Taft Republican isolationism in the MAGA movement. Ukraine brought that to the fore, and it now has a real hold on a significant element of the electorate. Even among those inthe GOP that support Ukraine, this movement has compelled them to be less strident in their support. A strong case made by Biden, not once but repeatedly over the past three years, could have blunted that effect.

It does seem clear that Trump will make some effort early in 2025 to mediate some sort of cease-fire. It is impossible to believe that Putin would agree to any plan that does not, at a minimum, cede vast amounts of Ukrainian territory to Russia. He might also insist on a new regime in Kyiv that amounts to nothing more than “Belarus South.” Ukraine’s bargaining power in such a situation will depend entirely on what Russian territory it holds and what pain it could inflict on Russia in the absence of a cease-fire. Both these conditions have been significantly retarded by the actions of Joe Biden and his team.

To his credit, Biden did loosen the rules on the use of US supplied munitions within Russian territory shortly after the election. Of course, this prompted Putin’s most recent nuclear threat tantrum which, as always, is all-rhetoric and no-substance. With luck, the Ukrainians will be able to strengthen their position in potential negotiations. It also goes without saying that the fact that such a limitation was originally in place was another Biden half-measure. As effective as Lend-Lease would have been had FDR told Churchill that none of the tanks or destroyers being provided could actually be used to ATTACK the Germans.

There should be no doubt that the very fact that Ukraine is still fighting the Russians nearly three years after the invasion began is, itself, a huge victory. The toll on Russian equipment and personnel is staggering and should be enough to silence anyone (short of Putin fanboys and apologists) who questions the utility of western aid to Kyiv. But the fact remains that so much more could have been achieved, including possible Ukrainian victory.

Putting aside counter-factual history, it is clear that Biden’s reflexive timidity has brought about four regrettable facts. Regardless of the costs to the Russians, the conflict has already cost the Ukrainians immeasurably. Additionally, and perversely, the best outcome we can reasonably hope for at this point is that munitions and support will continue to flow, and the war will drag on until the Russians relent, at an even greater cost to the Ukrainians. Thirdly, the prolonged conflict allowed the kernel of isolationism to grow and come to play a real role in US domestic politics. It is likely that that germ was already there, but Biden’s embrace of the war without explaining its importance allowed it to grow. Lastly, he has left the outcome of the conflict in the hands of a new administration whose intentions are, at best, a cause for real concern.

In many ways, the status quo in Ukraine, and how the actions of the outgoing administration shaped it, is an avatar for the rest of the world. As we shall see, the incoming administration will face a number of issues that have been left unresolved by the Biden team. Biden defenders can reasonably say that his actions prevented the collapse of Ukraine. At the same time, he can be criticized for not doing enough to assist Kyiv. Replace a couple proper nouns, and those sentences can be used for a number of other regions.

Cancelled because the Taliban took credit for bombing. And the fact that Taliban wold do something like that surprised him. As I said last week regarding another of the President’s seemingly idiotic ideas: C’mon, man!

I went on about why talking to the Taliban and trying to reach an agreement was bad enough last week. I won’t rehash it here. But I’ve thought of another bad result that I’ll add to the list. Why would any future pro-American faction want to step-up if they suspect that we’ll simply leave them in the lurch? The Afghans, the Iraqis… Sorry guys, the strongest nation in history is unwilling to shoulder the burden of honoring our commitments because our population is too ignorant to understand the true scope of the federal budget and the minuscule amount in question, let alone something like a cost benefit analysis and our politicians are too craven to try to explain it and we’ve become so adverse to casualties that something like the debacle in Mogadishu in 1993 might bring down a government these days,

But all that last week was before the whole Camp David thing came to light.

I really think that Trump, being essentially a non-political animal immersed in New York culture and not too interested in the world as he grew up in the 70’s and 80’s, sort of has a “We Didn’t Start the Fire” understanding of history, so there are certain buzzwords that he is vaguely aware of and holds some degree of significance. With that mindset, he seems to remember something about “Camp David” and “middle east” and thinks it would only be appropriate for him to do that as well. Maybe? It’s such a bad idea that I can’t think of another reason why he’s want to do it.

I’ll just say this about Afghanistan and be done. If you want to leave. If you hear the words “18 years” and think that that means it is time to leave. Whether you’re coming at it from the pacifist left or the isolationist right, it makes no difference. If that is your policy than just pack up and leave in the middle of the night like some sort of heavily armed Baltimore Colts. The same bad stuff will happen. And we’ll still (probably) have to go back in some manner soon enough. But at least we won’t have to subject ourselves to the indignity of reaching a deal with the Taliban.

You may be a fool, Mr. President, but don’t make the whole nation look like one.

• Greenland. Like everyone, I thought this was a joke when I first read it. Upon reflection, it’s an interesting idea and if Denmark had approached us regarding a possible transfer, I would have wholeheartedly supported it. But to create an issue out of thin air and then to create an international kerfuffle about it just shows the amateurishness of this administration. It reminds me of the “Annex Canada” bumper sticker my friend had on display. But it was in his locker and we were both in junior high. That said, the old school 19th Century diplomat in me would love to see a great big land-swap again.

• Russia’s nuclear accident. This got surprisingly little play, especially given that many of us just watched that amazing Chernobyl series on HBO. The accident itself, thankfully, seems to be small scale, but there are two distressing points. First, the Putin regime’s continued obsession over militarization. If indeed this was a botched test of nuclear fueled cruise missile, then the western allies need to recognize that there is a new arms race developing. It also reinforces my confidence that leaving the INF was the correct decision. Second, I will simply quote Pierce Brosnan’s James Bond from Goldeneye regarding Russia: “The governments change but the lies remain the same.” And that was in 1995! — at peak Yeltsin.

• Talking to the Taliban. Trump has representatives negotiating with the Taliban in Qatar. I can think of few things that make me more angry, on so many levels. First, our negotiating partners are the same idiots that the infallible Obama administration let go in exchange for Captain America Bowe Bergdahl, and were described as insignificant at the time. Second, the Afghan government that we allegedly support is there too, but we’ve basically told them to sit down and shut up. Third, we’ve been in Afghanistan for almost 18 years. Some see that as evidence that it is pointless and we should leave. Others, including myself, see it as all the more reason to stay - indefinitely if need be. To leave now would be an insult to those, living and dead, who served. It would condemn those Afghans, especially women and children, to misery. Fourth, like selling out South Vietnam, it would inevitably lead to the Taliban retaking the country and the (literal) slaughter of the existing government and its supporters. Fifth, the reconstitution of a safe haven for al-Queda, ISIS, and whoever else is looking for a cave to call home. In short, Trump keeps looking for new levels of stupidity, and somehow he keeps finding them.

• Trump’s support for Russia Rejoining the G7. C’mon man! Are you just trying to troll the “resistance” types?

As long as I have been intellectually engaged in international issues and political philosophy, it has been an unchallenged presumption that economic prosperity and development led to political liberalization. If not directly, then by the creeping demands of the population. A person with wealth and property seeks to protect both and looks to the rule of law to assist him. Without the law, the only methods of protecting one’s place and person is violence or persuasion, and neither is a reliable guarantor. The rule of law, provided either by independent courts or the government, provides the foundation for (economic) civil society.

But once the rule of law is enshrined to protect economic interests, it isn’t a long step toward protecting political interests. For that matter, it isn’t difficult to point out that most “political” matters are, in fact, economic. Jobs, taxes, health care, food, trade. All these are economic issues. James Carville was right when he said, “It’s the economy, stupid.” If you’re an exploited peasant working on farm in Maoist China or compelled to labor in a tractor factory under Stalin, your primary concern is protecting yourself and your family from arbitrary execution or imprisonment. The best way to do that was to keep your head down. But once you have a plot or your own land, or a home — let alone a bank account, TV or smartphone — you suddenly want to protect those things as well. Traditionally, we have seen such impulses as consistent with growing political participation.

The recovery of post-war Japan, followed by the political developments in East Asia and Eastern Europe in the 1980’s and 1990’s reinforced this belief. Nations with no real history of democratic government all turned to it. Particularly in Asia, where military dictatorships in places like South Korea and Taiwan became functioning (and vibrant) democracies in short order, this sequence was seen as the natural order. Fukiyama, more or less, wrote a whole book on it.

While the illustrations of the past 50 years are most relevant and most fresh in our minds, this pattern isn’t new. In fact it can be seen going back centuries, if not millennia. The English Civil War wasn’t a popular uprising, but rather the new commercial class, represented by Parliament, demanding a new deal from entrenched landed aristocracy, represented by Charles I. That very landed aristocracy was able to wield that power because they pinned-down King John at Runnymede four centuries before that. Despite the headline grabbing mob activity of the Bastille and the Women’s March, the French Revolution between 1789 and 1791 was driven by the demands of an economically mature bourgeoise looking for commensurate political rights, only to see the effort hijacked by radicals and psychopaths.

But look around the world today and while the economic development didn’t stop, there aren’t that many more democracies than in 1995. In fact, without consulting the statistics, I would wager there are slightly fewer. Russia can no longer honestly be considered democratic in any real way. China, most notably, never took the leap that we all thought was right around the corner. These two nations, perhaps, realized that there was an alternative “step 2” in the Underpants Gnome theory of economic development. If Step 1 is “provide economic opportunity” and Step 3 is “a content population,” for decades we have simply assumed that Step 2 must be “protect via rule of law.” China and Russia have demonstrated that Step 2 can also be “provide stability.”

The problem with that new “step 2,” and why I still subscribe to the belief that economic advancement ultimately leads to political participation, is the “provide stability” is easier said than done. And as economic development advances, that price of stability increases. Russia has maintained it through a fortuitous surge in energy prices and the recent memory of economic chaos in the 1990’s. China has maintained it through an astronomical and sustained growth in GDP. Both those conditions are beginning to fail. When the governments in Moscow and Beijing can no longer provide stability by buying-off discontent, their options will be limited.

The US response is less clear. Competing national interests, and conflicts within those siloed interests, makes all China policy surprisingly complex. But many of these choices are simplified if decision makers recognize the imperative described last week that faces the CCP. This IS a vital national interest to the Chinese. No element of the US relationship with Hong Kong is sufficiently important to justify jeopardizing a significant increase in tensions with Beijing — let alone an actual conflict. Instead, the USG should stand aside, and do what it can do diplomatically to mitigate any negative developments.

Instinctively, the US will look at the Tienanmen demonstrations and the international reaction as a guide. But for all the World Historical importance that has been ascribed to that event in the past three decades, Hong Kong has the potential to be levels of magnitude greater. The simple numbers involved — as many as four million HK residents — dwarf any previous circumstance. It also guarantees that any attempt to forcibly restore control will be equally massive in scale. The primary goal of US diplomacy should be to persuade the Chinese not to make that attempt.

But, as argued, if the protests continue, the Chinese have little choice but to choose action. The regime can wait to see if the crisis dies on its own accord. More likely, the demonstrations will continue, perhaps with less enthusiasm but still at unacceptable levels, but the world’s attention drifts to new crises. In this scenario, what can the US realistically do?

Conventional military force is out. Some sort of cyber attack or efforts to disrupt Chinese actions are a realistic option that could hamper but not impede Chinese efforts. These sorts of unconventional efforts are widespread today, even in the lack of a crisis. Efforts to demonstrate the ability to disrupt control systems and communication networks are the modern day deterrence equivalent of SAC having B-52’s airborne at all times. These actions won’t have any actual effect, but it’s something.

Public support for the protesters should be a given. Lack of support for the 2009 Iranian protests is frequently cited, with good reason, as one of the many low points of the Obama years. The prior Administration’s embarrassing efforts to ingratiate itself with the Mullahs in Iran prevented even modest encouragement of a movement that had real popular support in opposition to a regime that was (and is) implacably opposed to US interests. Regrettably, for all his trade bluster, President Trump seems to put a similar priority on maintaining good relations with Beijing, or at least not providing additional grievances. While we shouldn’t make promises, even implied promises, to the residents of Hong Kong that can’t be kept, it is our moral duty to express, at a minimum, sympathy for their plight and support for their positions. We should also remind the world that the protesters are simply standing up for rights they already enjoy, and that the Chinese government is legally bound to respect.

More than anything though, the complex and mutually critical economic relationship between China and US will prevent a serious response. Although trite and simplistic, economic concerns routinely trump human rights concerns. Even in 1989, when the economic relationship was embryonic, it prevented a stern response to Tienanmen. Today’s relationship makes any serious response unrealistic. Look, for example, at the Administration’s inability to place meaningful tariffs on Chinese goods, a reluctance that they themselves admit is due to an unwillingness to make Americans pay more for iPhones this Christmas. And tariffs are a policy that Trump champions and believes to be beneficial (even though his change of course demonstrates that he understands the effects of tariffs even his words indicate otherwise. A topic for another week….)

Never mind that a REAL trade war, let alone any sort of punitive sanctions against China as a whole or targeted at the CCP, could be met by a devastating response further negates the argument for striking at financial interests. Throughout everything, China has continued to buy treasuries and thereby allow the US to foolishly spend well beyond our budgetary means. If that spigot of cash were turned off, the negative repercussions on interests rates and federal spending would be severe and quick. If Beijing went a step further and started selling back those securities, the 2008 financial crisis would look positively benign.

But at the end of the day, perhaps a simple mental exercise will illustrate the doomed nature of trying to impede Chinese actions in Hong Kong. China must view internal threats as an urgent national security threat. The last time the US found itself in a similar position was in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The Bush Administration, with the strong support of the nation at large, determined that there was a vital interest in destroying the infrastructure behind those attacks in Afghanistan. At the time, without question, it was against the interests of China to see the United States attack a sovereign country to affect regime change, but they knew there was nothing they could do, and stood aside. Now imagine that Al-Qaeda had been based in Puerto Rico or some other territory under US sovereignty. That’s Hong Kong.

This year marks the 30th anniversary of 1989 — a year in which two communist empires took two very different paths. Early in the year, the Chinese government cracked down on pro-democracy protests in Tienanmen Square, while later in the year the Soviet-backed regimes of Eastern Europe did not. The fact that the CCP still rules in Beijing and that all the then-Soviet client states are now members of NATO and EU should fully demonstrate the efficacy of those approaches.

Now we are faced with a new pro-democracy demonstration. Again, the target is Chinese government. But this protest is not taking place in the capital, but rather in city that wasn’t even part of the PRC in 1989. And perhaps it is that fact that makes what is going on in Hong Kong, along with a couple others, that makes this situation very difficult for both China and concerned observers.

First, it must be noted that the Hong Kong protests are easy to distinguish from the 1989 protests in Beijing. Apart from the obvious geographic distinction, there is a difference in scale. Estimates put the number of protesters in Hong Kong at two million, a figure that represents fully 25% of the Hong Kong population. Second, at this point, they are not demanding new political or social rights, but rather protesting the possible denial of existing rights. In other words, the are seeking to maintain the status quo, not upset it. Lastly, in 1989 the government could argue that their actions, however brutal, were purely an internal matter. Their conduct in Hong Kong, however, is subject to limits agreed to by treaty.

Given those distinctions, how will the CCP choose to react? It is easy to believe that the authorities are fighting an instinct to crackdown on the protests. It is easy to believe that the survival of the party goes hand-in-hand with a compliant population. This argument is supported by the fact that 1) this has been the policy since 1989, 2) other authoritarian regimes that did not pursue the same course are gone, whereas 3) the CCP still reigns. This syllogistic argument is not based simply on the events of 1989. There have been reportedly hundreds of protests which have occurred since Tienanmen (with growing frequency, in fact) that go largely unreported and are dealt with internally. China pays no price for these actions.

But this is different, of course. Hong Kong is, currently, an open society — especially compared with the interior regions of the mainland. It is, in many ways, the outward face of modern China. These facts, and given that the world is already well aware of the present situation, a sudden black-out of coverage is impossible. Can the government simply “turn off” the internet? Yes. Can the government shut down the airport and effectively cut Hong Kong off from the world? Certainly — the protesters already did that themselves. But what would such actions accomplish? And what would they cost?

Hong Kong’s special status dates back to the handover agreement between the UK and the PRC, in which the Chinese agreed to allow Hong Kong to maintain its domestic institutions (including courts, common law or other individual guarantees). When the handover took place in 1997, the world watched with great interest. This was a time when China was nation still emerging from decades of isolation under Mao. They were only a few years removed from Tienanmen. The debates over trade with the PRC within the US were and annual occurrence. And while the economy of China had already begun its stratospheric rise, Hong Kong immediately represented 20% of Chinese GDP — a figure close to 4% today. For international reasons and domestic economic reasons, the CCP had ample incentive to leave well enough alone in Hong Kong.

Those incentives for Beijing to show restraint are diminished today. China’s place in the world secure. It’s regional role is matched only by the United States, and is being aggressively enhanced. The economic sway China can bring to bear is sufficient to cow other nations into silence over their domestic conduct. This extends beyond just state-to-state relations. International corporations will say nothing to upset their access to Chinese markets and labor, and will exert whatever influence they have over their governments to do likewise. (This reticence, more than anything, demonstrates the hypocrisy of the “woke capital” moment currently witnessed in the US and elsewhere. Corporations so quick to celebrate diversity or “boycott” states with “regressive” laws embarrass themselves by saying nothing about Chinese labor practices and social oppression.) And of course, no serious person would believe for a moment that any Chinese action in Hong Kong, no matter how extreme, would be answered by outside force.

But there are, nonetheless, disincentives to a crackdown. While China seems especially immune to concerns regarding its international human rights reputation, it should recognize that this may be different. Likewise, a hard line response will certainly derail any chance of further rapprochement with Taiwan for a generation. Hong Kong, the government must acknowledge, is unique. A crackdown there will result in capital flight that their flagging economy sorely does not need. As much as any other industry, the financial services sector depends on predictability and the rule of law. It would not be surprising to see similar exoduses of finance could occur from other cities on the mainland. International hubs like Singapore and Dubai came to be what they are today, in large part, to provide safe landings should there be a need to abandon Hong Kong.

Further disincentives can and should be presented by the international community. A crackdown on Hong Kong, given that special status, might (and should) be the bridge too far for some. China’s international partners should make it clear that they will do nothing in response to a hard line course of action. If China expects to sit at the “grown-up” table, these other nations should be willing to hold it to, at least, minimal standards of behavior. The UK, despite the distractions of a new government and looming Brexit deadlines, still needs to step up and demand that China honor its treaty commitments. China’s Asian neighbors might look to increase security cooperation in the face of such a clear expression of Chinese willingness to resort to force in areas where it previous felt constrained. And of course, the response of the United States weighs more heavily than all others’, and will be addressed in the next exciting episode of Monday Morning Diplomat.

This leaves the CCP in an unenviable situation. The demonstrators in Hong Kong are clearly, from their point of view, a threat to the authority of the regime. But acquiescing to their demands can also be seen, for the viewpoint of a authoritarian government, as a display of weakness that can not be tolerated. Further, there is no indication that order can be restored by Beijing using the existing resources in Hong Kong. That said, a crackdown from the outside could easily open a Pandora’s Box. But it might also settle the matter. Of course, the authorities can simply do nothing and hope that the flame of protest dies from lack of fuel. But to carry that analogy a step further, and untended fire might well die, but it might also spread and become uncontrollable.

International censure and condemnation, no matter how earnest, fades in time. The CCP learned that after 1989. Another lesson they learned three decades ago is that any element of control over the population lost may never be regained. Given the choices and risk/reward calculations available to Beijing, the protesters of Hong Kong may find the worst is yet to come.

Now, the Democrats are going though the same silly ritual, and Senator Elizabeth Warren has made it equally clear that she does not deserve to be trusted with paramount issues of national defense. Of course, I refer to her promise to change US nuclear policy to one of “No First Use.” The only distinction I will draw between her statements and Candidate Trump’s is that she volunteered her statements, as opposed to Trump speaking off the cuff.

Simply put, a nation pledged to a “No First Use” (NFU) policy promises not to use nuclear weapons against another nation unless that other nation has already used them in that conflict. NFU is the stated policy of only two current nuclear powers — China and India. It was also the stated policy, at least for a time, of the Soviet Union. The release of the Soviet archives shows that this was, in fact, a lie — the Kremlin planned to use nuclear weapons in the event of a general war in Europe. Given my distrust of totalitarian, putativly communist regimes, I suspect that China’s statements are equally disingenuous.

The alternative policy, and that currently maintained by all other declared nuclear powers (including the Unites States) is that these weapons would be employed only as a defensive measure, but not necessarily in response only to another nuclear attack. In other words, if the chips are down and the balloon goes up, all bets are off.

This has been American policy, more or less, since the Kennedy Administration. (Eisenhower employed the “New Look” policy which basically promised to bomb the hell out of an enemy in response to any attack. As excessive as that seems to readers today, it made more sense in an era where the expense of a conventional arms race was prohibitive and nuclear arsenals were both smaller and limited to delivery by bomber.) It survived the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam Era, detente, Reagan and the end of the USSR. It has been applied to all potential aggressors, implicitly and explicitly, including the Soviets, the PRC, Iraq, North Korea and everyone else.

Given that this has been the policy of the United States (and most everyone else) for over half-a-century, there would seem to be sufficient evidence to determine its efficacy. This reservation of the option to answer any attack with a nuclear response, which I’ll call Flexible Response (an imprecise term that was first set forth in 1960’s but still, technically, the US position), has coincided with a era of peace, most notably between the Great Powers. Its proponents argue that it creates sufficient uncertainty (a low bar, when the risk is a nuclear exchange) in mind of potential aggressors to effectively deter any significant aggression.

Those who support adopting a NFU policy could argue that this is a specious argument. They would say that the simple existence of nuclear weapons is a deterrent, regardless of the stated policy of the nation in question. That, perhaps, is true. It is certainly logical.

However, there are several inherent flaws with adopting a NFU policy. Each alone should be sufficient to dissuade any administration from changing policies.

• NFU Encourages Aggression. If a potential aggressor believes that the United States will not respond to any attack with nuclear weapons, the deterrent uncertainty of action is simplified. A nation that possesses local conventional superiority, Russia or China or North Korea for example, can envision scenarios where the incentives to use force are dramatically increased. If, on the other hand, aggressors do not believe US NFU promises, then we are still operating under the rules of Flexible Response.

• Our Allies Rely on the Threat of US First Use. NATO, historically, is a stronger supporter of flexible response than the US. Within the Alliance, it is unquestioned that the threat of US nuclear strikes to blunt the massive Soviet conventional advantage maintained the Cold War peace. This is also attitude of our Asian allies, where the need for nuclear deterrence is still very real. Major wars over Taiwan or the Korean peninsula have been avoided only due to the uncertainty of the American response.

• There is No Realistic Deterrent Option. Protecting our allies, as we are obligated to do under numerous treaties, in a NFU world is an unrealistic pipe dream. Such protection would, obviously, have to be guaranteed by conventional forces. We do not at present have sufficient forces to perform those duties, nor are we likely to spend the money that would be required to do so. Like it or not, the V Corps is not going to reconstituted, nor would it be sufficient if it were.

• We Need to Deter Other WMD Threats. There are more nations that posses chemical and biological weapons programs than nuclear ones. These threats are, in their own ways, more dangerous than nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons have been used with unfortunate regularity. A credible biological program is frighteningly easy to achieve, with horrific potential. The US does not need to have an CBW stockpile because we have made it clear in the past that we do not distinguish between which type of WMD is employed; we reserve the option to respond with nuclear weapons. Will that be the case under a policy of NFU?

• NFU is Simply Not Credible. Does anyone, especially anyone is Moscow, Beijing or Tehran, seriously believe that the United States would not resort to nuclear weapons if the stakes were high enough? Even if you don’t believe that we’d “trade Boston for Berlin,” would we allow our national survival to be put at risk and NOT use all the means at our disposal to defend ourselves? Would we want to elect a President who wouldn’t?

There could be a final bullet point there, but I’ll make it here instead. Placating the wingnuts of your party by promising not to use nuclear weapons (because that’s what they heard) is bad politics. If Warren actually believes what she said about NFU in the Detroit debate, she is unqualified to be President. If she doesn’t actually mean it and was simply fishing for votes, it probably disqualifies her on other grounds. It is no different than Trump’s comments 2016 that called into question his commitment to our NATO Article V commitments and those similar guarantees to our Asian allies. Those were equally dangerous and, in my mind, contributed to his unfitness for office.

And why did Warren even raise this as an issue? Are there elements of the Democratic electorate clamoring to revisit our strategic postures? It seems to be an issue, like the nuclear freeze or school busing, that has been dragged out of the closet where it has sat since 1984, or earlier. Was Warren a unilateralism back in the day? Where did she stand on the MX Peacekeeper and Pershing II? I mean, if we’re going back to that era….

Our current nuclear policy has helped keep the peace and prevent catastrophic exchanges since the 1946. Even if that assertion is wrong, or overstates the case, at the very least it must be acknowledged that our policy did not precipitate the use of nuclear weapons by any nation, let alone Armageddon. Adopting a No First Policy puts all of that at risk for no real benefit. And when the existence of humanity is at stake, that risk is simply too great.

The summer lull has come early to the world of international relations. Apart from Iran really, REALLY wanting to be attacked by anyone at all, very little seems to be happening. Britain in the late stages of an interregnum in Downing Street. Europe is on vacation. And the U.S. is already mired in presidential politics, which means domestic silliness. And in-between squabbles over who can give away the most in least amount of time and who can and can’t use which bathrooms, when the candidates are forced at virtual gunpoint to acknowledge the existence of other countries, what they say scary. Or at least very depressing.

The Democrats seem to be stuck reciting the refrain of 2004 and 2008. “Iraq is bad.” “If you voted for Iraq you’re bad.” “Mea Culpa, I voted for Iraq, but now I super-wouldn’t vote it.” Of course, “Iraq” as they’re talking about ceased to be in issue over a decade ago. Too many people are unwilling to admit that the Surge worked, and Obama was handed a (admittedly very fragile) non-problem, and proceeded to smash it against a wall as if to prove something. It’s as if Walter Mondale had gone on-and-on about Vietnam while debating Reagan. It’s getting kind of old.

And who cares, anyway? The only people who seem to hate the Iraq War more than Democrats are the current batch of Trumpy “Republicans.” (I find it remarkable that they still at times label “Never Trumpers” as RINO’s, despite the fact that those targets all voted Bush, Dole, Bush, Bush, McCain, Romney and when it is in fact the New Stalwarts who were never dedicated to the party.) These new Republicans, like any example of a purity police, hate the heretic much more than the infidel. And in their mania to “mainstream” Trumpism as the “real” conservatism, all competing forms must be destroyed. While this is primarily the subject of domestic politics, foreign policy is equally subject to redefinition.

(As an aside, there is a fascinating war going on in intellectual conservative circles between those advocating “traditional” individual rights, limited government and those arguing for post-liberalism, anti-enlightenment, pro-society attitudes. Kind of scary, kind of cool.)

But back to the Democrats. They’re all about free trade, and NATO, and standing up to Russia. That’s great, but I’ve been around long enough to know that it isn’t honest. It’s honest only so much as it is anti-Trump. If Trump started bombing Moscow tomorrow, the Democrats would suddenly be all over Russia like Sanders on a honeymoon. And the front-runner, the “adult," the “moderate,” — a supposed Foreign Policy Expert — was wrong on every major foreign policy and trade issue he was presented with while in the Senate, except of course Afghanistan, which no senator opposed. And the Iraq War, which he now super-opposes. Mea Culpa. (Credit where credit is due. He was generally correct on Balkans issues in 90’s.)

Despite everything have written above, I can’t blame these policies on the parties themselves, per se. These are, in every sense, retail politicians. They are skilled at knowing what the public want, and giving it to them. Non-politician Donald Trump perhaps even more so than the others. People don’t want to think about foreign affairs. I’ve never quite understood why, but it is clearly the case. Foreign entanglements make them have to hear about places they don’t know. Sometimes they even see casualties and don’t know why, but don’t care enough to become educated about what, exactly, is going on and whether there is merit to the effort. Politicians see this, and so we get promises to bury our heads in the sand and let those people in other countries burn down the world if that’s what they want. So, unless something happens, it appears that many of us will be without a political home for the foreseeable future.

But if you extend that spectrum back in time, it doesn’t take long for those Overton Windows to retroactively shift, and soon we find the place where Donald Trump belongs. And oddly enough it’s a place where he was. He’s a 1980’s Democrat.

Almost three decades ago, Bill Clinton began the transformation of the Democratic party in the “centrist” style advocated by the then-cutting edge Democratic Leadership Council. As the narrative tells it, the oldest political party in the world was reeling from losing campaigns in five of the previous six presidential elections, and even that one victory was Jimmy Carter’s narrow win in 1976, a year that should have been a post-Watergate romp. Three of those five loses weren’t even competitive. Only a radical course change could revive the party.

(A brief aside on domestic politics — normally a no-go zone for MMD, but this is domestic politics from long ago: The historical narrative above, like most, is accepted because it is the way it actually happened. However, the 1992 election was unique in so many ways. The presence of Ross Perot. George H.W. Bush’s horrible, horrible campaign. Bill Clinton’s generational gift at retail politics. A mild, but critically timed, recession. The absence of any of those things could have turned the election to Bush. Likewise, and relevant to point I am laboring to make, Bill Clinton in primaries was the best of bad choices. He had trouble fending off the probably insane Jerry Brown and his 800-number and drove my undergrad self to place a Paul Tsongas bumper sticker on my car for a period of weeks. Clinton simply could not lose that primary, even if there were a dozen bimbo-eruptions. This bad crop of candidates was the result of George Bush’s astronomically high approval numbers post the Gulf War, and the fact that it scared most major Democrats out of the race. Had Mario Cuomo opted-in, I am certain that there would have been no Democratic move to the center.)

But Clinton did win in 1992. And while it took the GOP wave in 1994 to persuade him to find the “third-way” in domestic affairs, he did not hesitate to reform the Democratic approach to international affairs. And what was swept away was a legacy of protectionism and pacifism that appears to be back in vogue.

Let’s look at the things he actually cares about in the IR world, and compare that to mainstream Democrats during the Reagan/Bush years.

Trade: How did NAFTA pass? Not because of Al Gore debating Perot on Larry King. It passed with Republican votes — more Republican in both house voted in favor of the agreement than Democrats, despite the later having solid majorities in both chambers. Similarly, it was Democrats who consistently opposed the Clinton led efforts to grant China “Most Favored Nation” trade status and ultimately the PRC’s ascension to the World Trade Organization. Speaking of the WTO, it was Clinton who concluded the Uruguay Round of GATT (remember GATT?) and brought the WTO into existence. All of this was done with the help or Republicans, over the objections of the old-guard in his own party.

Growing up in Detroit in the 80’s, perhaps I am somewhat parochial in my upbringing, but a constant theme of the Reagan years was the Japanese trade deficit and a call for quotas on Japanese imports to the US. Organized labor, in its death throws, compelled Democrats to push this line. Trump? Traditional organized labor in the industrial sector is gone, at least as political force. But the men and women who it claimed to represent are Trumpists. They’re the 80’000 voters in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania that gave him his victory. Replace “Japan” with “China” and you have Trump’s industrial policy.

Security: The anti-Trump left (AKA, “the left”) seems to believe that Trump is bellicose warmonger. I do not know whether this belief is sincere, or just a reflexive Democratic attack on anyone with an “-R” after their name, but in either case it is clearly wrong. Trump, like Obama before him, strongly criticized foreign military engagement during the campaign, running far to the left of Hilary Clinton. Again, like Obama, he promised to bring troops home and keep them here, and he has done so with much greater success than his predecessor. He has balked at confrontations with or involvement in North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Syria, Yemen, et al. In fact, all he has really done is drop a really big bomb on ISIS and confronted Iran on most matters short of confrontation. Conspicuously short of confrontation.

In this conflict-adverse regard, he would be more at home in the Democratic debates than (one would think) the GOP. Add to this his long and consistent criticism of the Iraq War - to the point of taking the Michael Moore-ian position that George W. Bush lied in order to gain support for the war, and even the original Gulf War and you have an approach to military action that reminds one of Code Pink more than Dick Cheney. But Trump likes tanks in his parades and doesn’t like illegal immigrants and seems like a bully, so he’s a warmonger. In fact, this is hardly the case and Trump would have been voting with the Ted Kennedy’s, Paul Wellstone’s and Alan Cranston’s (and Joe Biden’s) had he been given the chance.

———

So if you seek to know where Trump will fall on major issues of war and peace or trade and industry, just look to the Democrats 1988 party platform. It might have some interesting clues.

(And I didn’t even touch the Democrats unwillingness to directly confront the Soviets and their calls for reducing tensions and how that compares to Trump’s approach to Putin.)

First there was a summit meeting. Followed by a second. The period in-between peppered with friendly tweets about Kim Jong-Un and his character.

And now, in the wake of their third meeting, held at the symbolism-heavy DMZ, Kim asked Trump to step across the line and into the glorious land of the chosen people — AKA the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. And here’s the kicker: The President took him up on the offer.

Normally a Presidential state visit is about as choreographed at a Beyonce concert. Move here, transit there, go by this route, so many minutes, arrive, shake hands with this person, then that person., sit here, smile for 30 seconds of photo ops, etc. Of course, Trump don’t roll that way. And one more box is checked on the DPRK’s wish list.

If you had asked the North what they wanted most, diplomatically, in 2016 they might have mumbled something like “two-party talks with the Americans.” Not even in their wildest dreams would they have dared to suggest a summit with the U.S. President. Somewhere farther on down the road would have been the even crazier “U.S. President comes to North Korea.”

And they got them both. The price for these huge, huge wins? Absolutely nothing. Vague hints at “denuclearization,” which means something very different to them than to us. But it doesn’t matter what it means, because they backed off even from that. And they still got more summits. And the impromptu crossing the boarder photo-op. Pro- and anti-Trump, most are tired of the old canard about Trump as a master deal-maker. But here, as much as anywhere, we see that he just doesn’t get it. If he were truly interested in making the “best deals” for the U.S., he’s failed miserably to secure anything in exchange for giving the North these two great wins. I don’t think he did it stupidly, or treasonously, or out of some man-crush on Kim. He just didn’t know he was giving away something of value, because he is ignorant of statecraft. And apparently he must not listen to those near him. This is the danger of Trump’s foreign policy. Ignorance. And, like a doughy shark who found a fertile feeding ground, Kim will come looking for more. Next up is either a trip from Kim the Washington, or acknowledgement of the DPRK as a nuclear power.

Maybe we can get both done over a weekend at Mar-a-lago.

Iran did continue to escalate, and it appeared that they found that line that we couldn’t allow them to cross — that line being one of our pricier surveillance drones. The President was urged to act and agreed to do so. But then he changed his mind, because, you know…. Trump.

(I had a sort of epiphany regarding Trump and where his foreign policy fits in the American tradition — and it fits comfortably — which I will save for next week. Assuming he doesn’t do anything stupid in Asia. Touch wood.)

Somehow, this is the least satisfying response. It shows that Iran where the line is, almost. It shows other would-be adversaries that bluster means nothing (in case they forgot Trump’s initial attitude towards North Korea). It undercuts the national security elements of his cabinet. It shows him to be whatever the bad flavored word for “mercurial” is.

What this shows is that the US doesn’t really have an Iran policy. That policy was, it seems, pull out of JCPOA. Trump, eventually, did that. Thereby he accomplished the one thing he promised to do as a candidate that I supported. Since then, there seems to have been no plan. Perhaps the plan was simply to wait and see how the Mullahs would react. Well, now we know. And that reaction was probably the most predictable available to them. But we didn’t seem to be prepared for it. Or, if we were, Trump seems to not have been committed to it. So before we allow more events to unfold, each of which might compel, or require, a response, the Administration needs to develop a clear strategy.

I’ve got one. Increase economic pressure, while discouraging the Iranians from further attacks. This will ultimately either compel them to return to the negotiating table or, even better, drive the people back into streets and bring down the government. Each of these prongs can be achieved, at least by a disciplined administration.

First, the sanctions must be tightened even further. Iranian intransigence will, ultimately, force the Europeans to act — either to reduce their pressure or increase it. It should be within our ability to keep our allies informed, consulted and on-board. Serious partners could make the difference, but nothing that this administration has done seems to be conducive to such cooperation. Maybe it is time to rebuild those bridges.

Second, discouraging Iran from further escalation must, from this point forward, take the form of military action. Such action must be decisive and disproportionate. It should be targeted exclusively at military facilities, such as Revolutionary Guard bases, air defenses, and naval assets. This will minimize any resulting increase in pro-regime sentiment on the part of the population. Further, these strikes must be carried out exclusively by American forces. While America is viewed favorably by average Iranians, any coordinated effort involving much despised Arabs or the Israelis would be counter-productive.

What is the ultimate strategic goal? Ideally, it would be the end of the Islamic Republic. Going back to storming of our embassy, the Iranians have been the most consistent and intractable enemy we have faced. During that time, they have killed more Americans in combat than any other nation — nearly 1000 during the Iraq war we are now told, and even more if you count those killed by Iranian surrogates such as Hezbollah in Beirut, the Khobar Towers bombing and elsewhere. They are on verge of a nuclear weapon (Thanks, Obama), and the example of North Korea should provide all the incentive needed to prevent a repeat with Iran. For these reasons alone, we should be willing to do whatever is necessary to remove the regime. Yes, anything. But I reluctantly bow to domestic political realities, and accept that we will not be doing “anything.” So, we need to squeeze Tehran until the people go the streets (best) or the government comes back to the table for serious talks that will actually end their nuclear program, not protect it.

There’s really nothing else to say. This isn’t as bad as Obama’s “Red Line” in Syria, but it’s in the conversation. I have been doing a good deal of “President ranking” lately, and find it curious in the space of four administrations, we suffered through possibly the three worst. Pierce (1853-7), Buchanan (1857-61) and Johnson (1865-9) were all horrendous and fell within the space of 16 years. (And to observe that possibly the best President was the odd man out in that string only adds to the oddness.) Similarly, we’re looking at quite possibly the two worst foreign policy administrations taking place successively, (And the chances for improvement in 2020 look slim.)

The Trump Administration and US intelligence agencies assert that Tehran is behind the attacks on tankers in the region over the past several weeks. A Japanese tanker was hit while the Japanese Prime Minister was dealing directly with the the Mullahs to de-escalate the situation. Bellicose statements fly, and it appears that there is a better-than-even chance that the US might directly engage Iranian military forces for the first time since the Reagan years.

As great as it would feel to hit the Iranians in the proverbial jaw, I would advise against it.

Not because the Iranians are innocent. Or that the US is partially to blame because we put them in a box and left them no choice. (An argument that you hear often, but I can’t even follow. How are the effects of tightening sanctions and closer cooperation with the Gulf states relieved by attacking oil tankers?) Rather, we must refrain from attacks, either sustained or pin-prick, because it is what the Iranians want.

The truth is, those sanctions are working. And as they are tightened, the regime is feeling the pressure. Ten years after the uprisings that Obama ignored, things in the Islamic Republic aren’t really any better. The billions of dollars Obama sent to Tehran didn’t seem to make it to people — sorry Andrew Yang, no Freedom Dividend for Iranians. The leadership is scared, and they need something to either distract the people, or someone else who can blamed for the suffering. An military confrontation with the US, Tehran believes, would give them both.

That may or may not work. Totalitarian regimes have long blamed the outside world for the suffering of their beleaguered populations. There is ample evidence that, despite the propaganda fed to them, ordinary Cubans, East Germans, Venezuelans, etc. etc. realized that their plight was homegrown. Would the average Iranian, most of whom are too young to remember the Shah’s police state and have known only war and economic isolation under the Ayatollahs, rise up to defend the state if some naval facilities and air defense equipment was attacked.? Unlikely. But possible. And is the risk of that possibility worth a couple docks or radar sites?

I can’t see how it could be, especially given the likely response. Iran would seek to prolong any low level conflict, and would continue to engage in provocative actions. More attacks on tankers. Increase in pressure on US assets in Iraq. A likely surge in Hamas attacks on Israel. Iran has no lack of fingers on pressure points that can be used to harm American interests and allies in the region.

Of course, I fully recognize that if the attacks that have already taken place do not provoke a response, then Iran may nonetheless pursue a path of escalation, on the assumption that sooner or later they would cross a line that can’t be ignored. It must be made clear to Tehran that if they choose that course, the consequences might not be the low level conflict they seem to crave. Unfortunately, I don’t think the precise, measured and gravely serious tone in which that message would need to be delivered can be achieved in 280 characters.

The Chavista regime of Maduro is repugnant. Without going into how great Venezuela was and how it was ruined by socialism, I will simply request that the reader take judicial notice of that. No one (apart from Rep. Omar and AOC apparently) can take issue with that.

But it is not our job to take down every awful regime in the world. I say this not as a Trumpian isolationist, but as a realist. We don’t have that capability. In the cases where our interests and security are at stake (Iran, North Korea), or where “we broke it” (Syria), or both (Iraq), we do need to leave regime change on the table. Venezuela, however, represents a different class: The Americas.

The first foreign policy principal that this nation followed was laid down by Washington. His warning to stay out of European affairs was well-considered, especially at the time. From his point of view, Europe was embroiled in the Wars of the French Revolution and there was nothing to be gained by getting involved. further, Washington had been driven to despair by the domestic response to the Jay Treaty with Britain, which he accepted only because it preserved the peace. But beyond the immediate world of that day, the United States was simply incapable of hanging with the big boys back then, as the War of 1812 would demonstrate.

But the second principal that was laid down is what became the famous Monroe Doctrine. And while we all know that it was really written by John Quincy Adams, not Monroe, what isn’t as widely known is that no one cared to actually use it enforce a policy until the (second) Cleveland Administration (1893-1897). Even when Phil Sheridan and the Union cavalry was sent from Appomattox to the Mexican border to encourage the French installed Emperor Maximilian to depart, no one thought to invoke the Monroe Doctrine as our justification.

But since we found it useful to cloth our policies in Latin America in the legitimacy of the Doctrine, it has proven useful. Through it we gained the Panama Canal and kept the Communists (mostly) out. And while it can be argued that the heavy hand of the Yanquis did occasionally come down too heavily, I think any honest criticism of American policy towards Central and South America should be more directed at benign neglect than overbearing imperialism. And would the past 150 years been any better for those nations if they were also contending with the heavy hands of Britain, France, Germany, the Soviets, etc..? If anything, the Monroe Doctrine should be credited with keeping the hemisphere remarkably placid during a period when the other half of the world played host to some of mankind’s darkest moments.

So now, apparently, we’re going to throw all of that away. Because one party can’t bring itself to condemn socialism and the other is headed by an isolationist buffoon. And not to deny credit where it’s due, the Obama administration was all too willing to sacrifice Venezuela to his diplomacy-as-public-relations “victory” in Cuba. There’s no way he could have sat next to Castro at that ballgame if he was critical of what was happening in Caracas.

The result of all this short-sighted ignorance is that there are now Russians and Chinese and, of course, Cubans in Venezuela. Forget all that, Hezbollah is in Venezuela. Frigging Hezbollah! And are we demanding that they leave? No, we’re left to consider if we can really do something to assist the uprising, given the presence of those parties. This isn’t the Ukraine, or Gaza or the Spratly Islands. This is Venezuela. A couple hours away, in the same time zone as New York and DC. Rich in oil. With a history that, until the Clown Hugo Chavez came along, could be viewed with pride. That’a all gone now, but perhaps not forever. Maduro will go, and Venezuelans may again prosper. But the “powers” that be in the White House and the Hill can’t see that something important to this nation, something that we can be proud of, is also at risk. And once the Monroe Doctrine is ignored without consequences, it may not recover as easily.

Any sober analysis of the international community must conclude that the US-PRC relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world, both now and for the the foreseeable future. The reflexive understanding is that it is the superpower of the 20th century and the superpower of the 21st, an understanding that is possible but not yet inevitable. I remarked in an earlier post that the the only time in modern history when one global hegemon yielded peacefully to its successor was the transition from Britain to the United States a century ago. If the conventional wisdom is correct, and the coming decades will see the transition from America to China, the world can only hope that that achievement can be repeated, as we live through the first transition from one nuclear power to another.

The rise of China seems meteoric. In many ways it is, but it is not unique. America’s economic growth between 1860-1900 was probably comparable, even if it wasn’t matched by a concomitant rise in military power (setting aside the blip of 1865, when the post-Civil War United States briefly possessed the strongest military in the world). Great Britain’s rise from 1688 occurred in quick order. But neither of those accessions was disruptive, or at least potentially as disruptive, as China’s. Perhaps the more apt comparison is Germany’s post-unification rise, which more or less occurred simultaneously with the rise of the United States. The fact that one of those concurrent bursts of development led to a series of crises and, ultimately, two world wars while the other went widely unnoticed is telling.

Germany’s development was disruptive. Long the geo-political playground of the great powers, Germany was not united until the Westphalian state system was long established. A united Germany represented a threat to each of its neighbors (indeed, it had soundly defeated two of them on the path to unification). The Prussian military which dominated the new state was the clearly the most-powerful on the continent. The economic and industrial potential of Germany was clear from the outset. While not motivated so much by grievance, its leaders did feel that the new nation deserved all the “perks” enjoyed by the other great powers. On the other hand, Third Republic France was incapable of letting go of memories of the debacle that was the Franco-Prussian War, memories that inspired both fear and passion for revenge. Across the channel, Britain hoped only maintain a continental balance-of-power that had facilitated the Pax-Britannia era. Europe’s unsurprising inability to reconcile these goals led the disastrous first half of the 20th Century.

The question before us now is what sort of rise is China undergoing, and what kind does it want. From the outset of Deng Xiaoping era, when a backwards and insular nation, beaten down physically, mentally, politically by Mao, was told it was glorious to be rich, until around the turn the century, China’s development understandably cautious. Foreign cooperation was rare and viewed by China and their foreign partners with suspicion. (The many stories my father, an executive at Ford, told me of the behavior of a Chinese team sent on one of these exchanges in the late 1980’s still bring a smile to my face.) But the rate of expansion led to strange contradictions in the 1990’s. Chinese desire to demonstrate their modernity and technological prowess indeed led to space program, but one that launched satellites made of wood. Long held political/nationalistic bugbears, such as Taiwan, could not be set aside and led to headline grabbing confrontations between the PRC and US Navy. The over-riding perennial China issue of the Clinton years was whether or not to grant Most Favored Nation trade status, and the decision was always coupled with China’s human rights record.

But at this time, the trade issues with China were still primarily a one way street. The “VAST CHINESE MARKET” was still a theoretical thing. Certainly, there were large orders of airlines and heavy industry goods, but the Chinese “middle class” was still a thing that western companies — looking for new markets — could only imagine. At this time, China was just the place where goods could be manufactured on the cheap and sale elsewhere. This is the China that seems to still exist in the mind of Trumpian protectionists.

Up through the 90’s and even into this century, I felt there was almost no reason to fear China. Their economy was developing quickly. The decision makers and the elite were doing well. There was no incentive for the leadership in Beijing to rock the boat. The system was working for them, and it seemed that the utmost goal for China was stability. Domestic and international.

Domestic security in China seems to be almost an afterthought. Apart from the odd dissident and regions with ethnic minority majorities, the last time the Communist leadership had to sweat things out was 1989. In retrospect, the oddest thing about 1989 in China was that there crisis of legitimacy came before their comrades in Europe. Deng turned the PLA on the demonstrators without any special insight or the cautionary tale of the recent fall of another totalitarian regime. On the contrary, it was the Tienanmen crack-down that Egon Krenz told his East German colleagues to use as template to save their doomed regime five months later.

But it worked. While Kremlinologists love to point out that Russians, especially during the oil boom days a decade ago, were all too happy to sacrifice political participation for stability. Both the “stability” of life under the Soviets and the chaos of the Yeltsin years are cited as reasons why they are comfortable with that arrangement. I think such assertions sell people short. But they are at the core of the post-Tienanmen understanding of the relationship between the Chinese government and people. For a population that was impoverished, if not enslaved, until very recently (by the government they now tolerate, it should be noted), with no tradition of political participation for the entirety of their long history, perhaps it can be understood. But this arrangement will break in time. Economic prosperity inevitably leads to demands for political participation. The government can increase the buy-off given for only so long, and if I were a better statistician and political theorist I could chart the relationship more directly, but at some point the price of denying the franchise can no longer be paid by the government. This is how the rule of the communist party in China will end. The cost of repression will exceed their ability to pay.

Oddly, some in the west (including Tom “super-genius” Friedman) look at this Chinese system and see something to emulate. “If only the United States could be China for a day…. “ What is really being said is, :”If only we didn’t have a Constitution, divided government, property rights and the rule of law. Wow, we could really get things done!” Yeah, they’re right. China can get things done. But which system can sustain itself? There are only so many high-speed trains and modern skyscrapers you can build. And then what do you give the people? A “social-credit rating” scheme, I guess.

International security is a different matter, obviously. China’s quest for stability, present since the economic rise began, hasn’t changed. But how to achieve that stability has. During the first decade of the century, the world changed in ways that did not sit well in Beijing. Post-9/11, the United States seemed too willing to confront problematic regimes rather than tolerate them. National independence movements were again asserting themselves. Popular uprisings against unrepresentative governments were being encouraged. Coupled with a new focus, especially beginning around 2010, on North Korea, the PRC suddenly saw a world in which others, including the United States, did not want stability. The Chinese military build-up of the past two decades is not an attempt to create a PLA and PLN that can project force for the sake of projecting force (at least not yet). But it must, they feel, project force as a deterrent. But they seek to deter actions that will subvert internal stability, not military action directed at them. They seek a military that can successfully invade Taiwan and deter the 7th Fleet from sailing into the Straits, whether they intend to invade or not.

That paragraph isn’t meant to excuse bellicose Chinese behavior, simply explain it. Their claims to entire South China Sea must be disputed and challenged, as we do. Demands that cooperation between the U.S. and Japan and ROK be curtailed must be ignored, as they are. Chinese quests to dominate resource rich countries in Africa and elsewhere must be challenged through investment, trade, diplomacy and cooperation. Worries about the fact that the Chinese could destroy the U.S. economy overnight by dumping their Treasuries should be put aside, for such action would be equally suicidal for China and the world. Further, while Trump’s trade tirades are ignorant and ill-considered, some pressure must be brought on the Chinese to end their mercantilism policies that run counter to the free-trade policies that we should be advocating. Perhaps a return to the annual review of MFN status is a better tool than threatening trade wars. But we have tools.

China is rising. No one disputes that. But that rise can and must be managed. And nowhere is it written that they are fated to run the world as the next hyper-power, although perhaps they will. Several hurdles, mostly internal, must yet be faced.

Which smoothly transitions to what parts of the Russian tampering narrative I will discuss. The “tampering” part. As opposed to “collusion.” Trump may not have colluded with the Russians, but that doesn’t mean they didn’t interfere on their own accord. Russia did meddle with the election. They did run “bots” and Facebook ads to create confusion.

Do I like that Russians are trying to sway voters in this country? No. But it is in their national interest to do so. And they didn’t just start — the Soviets planted stories and paid candidates throughout the West as far back as Stalin. We can be certain that the Chinese do it as well, and no doubt are very good at it. More openly, there are lobbying groups representing nations and ethnicities around the world that advocate for their interests. Not only do I hope we do the same, we don’t even try to conceal it much of the time. The Clinton Administration could not have done more to keep Boris Yeltsin in office if they tried. Obama and his team would have pushed Netanyahu out of Air Force One if they had the opportunity. And again, we do so because we perceive certain electoral results to better suit our needs. It’s all about those consistent national interests that I mentioned.

But even while I understand the legitimate interests the Russians have in sowing discord in our electoral process, that doesn’t mean we don’t have an even greater interest in preventing such meddling. I would like to think that Facebook ads don’t change voting habits, and the studies show that they do not, but that doesn’t mean we can disregard them. We obviously need to be vigilant against foreign hackers compromising actual vote totals, but the cumulative effect of dozens or scores or more anonymous posts and ads being seen daily can not be dismissed out of hand. Once there is a real, definable effect on an election, people will lose faith in the system going forward.

Despite that dire possibility, we’re not there yet. Mueller was tasked with investigating Russian Meddling, which includes but isn’t limited to Collusion. I hope that when we see the actual report, which we will, there will be serious attention paid to this. Given the fact that we’re talking about Russian state actors and their hirelings, though, such hopes should be reasonable. I doubt that Mr. Mueller had wide open access to FSB personnel or files. And if he somehow did, I hope that fact is deeply, deeply redacted. Regardless, people are now, perhaps, a bit more savvy about being manipulated. And the liberals who once sung the praises of Wikileaks now, at least for the moment, acknowledge that it is just a Russian supported Agent of Chaos. These minor steps, if true, are better than nothing. But does the fact that we see these kernels of meddling mean that we are now immune? Hardly.

In fact, I will go so far as to say that we’ve missed the forest for the trees. All those ads and bots and leaks did nothing to actually effect the outcome of the election. Nonetheless, the Russians just pulled off an operation against our system unrivaled in its success. Not only a success in terms of it’s destabilizing effect on our democracy, but also in that nobody seems to understand that it happened. But it did. It was that big of a success. Put simply, it is fairly evident that all of the domestic political strife brought about by the allegations of Russian Collusion, which has torn this country apart for almost three years, is in fact the result — intentional result — of Russian Meddling. Yes, the Collusion didn’t happen, it was a narrative CREATED as a result of the Meddling.

OK, maybe this is getting a bit complex, thanks to the syntax. So let’s go step by step. In 2016, the Hillary campaign, through their law firm Perkins Coie, engaged Fusion GPS to do oppo research on Trump. (Fusion had been working on a similar project for the Washington Free Beacon during the GOP primaries, but terminated the project after Trump secured the nomination.) Fusion GPS, working with former British spy Christopher Steele (to be played by Michael Sheen in the movie), at this began poking around Europe for dirt. Steele turned to his high-placed sources in and around the Russian government and they gave him just what he was looking for. And the resulting Steele Dossier, which somehow landed in the hands of the Obama FBI and Justice Department led to the FISA court which lead to tapping which lead to….. on and on.

I’m not indicting the Clinton campaign, or singling them out for taking a course of action that led to the production of a salacious, dubious, unverified (in fact, widely debunked). It was an honest attempt at opposition research, and I have no problem with that. It is a part of campaigns. It always has been, an always will be. (If it is ever shown that they somehow supplied it to the Justice Department while vouching for it’s authenticity. Well, that ‘s a little different.) What I am angry about, or at least troubled by the fact that no one seems to care, is the fact that it seems obvious that the Russian government fed false information about an American presidential candidate to an individual acting (indirectly, but knowingly) for the opposing candidate. That information, even though widely disproved or dismissed, served as the basis for multi-year investigation of the President and effectively handicapped his administration on many issues while casting doubt not just on his legitimacy, but in fact his loyalty to the United States. I can’t imagine that whoever in the Kremlin decided to feed this information to Steel could have dreamt of just how successful the operation would be. Putin should give him the Order of Lenin (whatever it’s called now) immediately, if he hasn’t done so already.

This isn’t to say that this is as Putin planned it. In fact, I don’t believe that Putin wanted to see Trump elected. I think he wanted Hillary. He knew her. He’d run circles around her and her boss. He had no reason not believe that she wouldn’t roll over in the same manner that Obama had. Putin had (has) her emails, the mere suggestion of which could have been used against her. He knew that Trump in defeat would have railed against a rigged election, an argument that Putin would have echoed and used domestically as further evidence that democracy is corrupt. At the same time, he could tell his people that the West again chose the anti-Russian candidate as further evidence of Russian persecution. But Trump won, and with him came two years of chaos.

So, while there seems to be nothing that can support the claims that Russian bots persuaded 80’000 Midwestern Hillary fans to switch their vote for Trump, it seems equally obvious that they accomplished something far more insidious instead. And we don’t seem to even want to acknowledge how badly we were played.

I am of mixed emotions on Brexit. First, to plainly state my biases, I am an incurable Anglophile. I view the so-called “Special Relationship,” and its broader embodiment within the US/UK/CAN/AUS/NZ ambit, as the most important strategic fact of the past century. Without it, the Nazi’s would likely have triumphed. NATO would not have been formed. The world economic system would not exist. Show me another example of one global hegemon peacefully passing that role to another. I can think of none.

Likewise, I am not reflexively anti-Europe. I am still enough of globalist Utopian that I see benefits from multi-lateralism and I still smile when I look at the “EUROPE” coffee mug I received in Brussels in 1993. While I miss spending D-marks, I don’t miss Francs. From a less personal perspective, the existence of the EU has certainly played a role in keeping Europe at peace for the past 70 years. If NATO kept the Soviets at bay, the Treaty of Rome did so for the Germans. (And let’s give credit to France. The Third Republic would have created the EEC to isolate the Germans. The Fourth saw the wisdom in tying both nations together as closely as possible.)

But there is a difference between an economic bloc and a continental megastate. And in spite of the similarities of population, economies, political systems and culture, Europe is not the United States. There is too much historical baggage to unpack. Nations and national identities are too ingrained to expect them to be cast aside. Attempts to turn the EU into something greater are doomed to failure. Brexit is a sign of that. The French and Dutch rejections of the Lisbon Treaty ten years earlier were signs. Northern resentment of the south is sign of that. Take an example from US history: Recall how difficult it was to sow together this nation in 1780’s and 90’s. If thirteen tiny, former colonies, sharing a common language, heritage, legal and political systems, and revolutionary experience wedged precariously between an ocean and a hostile wilderness could barely come together, how can modern Europe? The dreams of the Eurocrats will remain just that. Dreams. At least for several generations.

Perhaps a smaller EU could have formed a strong union. Or a weaker union could keep more members happy. But the EU suffers from UN-syndrome. An entity with too many members, with too many agendas and expectations, can’t expect to reconcile all of them. Every individual nation joined the EU to achieve individual state goals. Not one joined with the primary objective to further the European Ideal. It was to protect inefficient farmers, or fisherman, or obtain wealth transfers or cleanse oneself of genocide. (Sorry.)

On the night of the Brexit vote, I glibly observed on Twitter (is there any other way to observe on Twitter?) that it was hard to believe that the British would object to being part of a administrative hyper-state. When I look at that way, I can understand the rationale behind the decision. I admit that I was not too attentive to the argument of the “leave” campaign, since I assumed there was little chance that the campaign would succeed. Remember, this wasn’t too long after Scotland opted to “remain” in the UK. I understood, but didn’t sympathize, with the arguments of Scottish nationalists, and when they failed in their campaign, I only assumed the much less clear case for leaving the EU would fail as well. But when, post-referendum, I looked for the motivating issue that drove 52% to vote “leave,” I couldn’t find it. I should not be surprised that that 52% was a coalition. A coalition that, to be sure, contained an element of political thinkers that saw the role of Brussels to be an ever growing part of daily life, at the expense of Westminster. But it also contained the English equivalent of the blue collar build-the-wall Trump voter, as well as benign nationalists and malign racists. There were also some that simply wanted to “watch the world burn,” as Alfred Pennyworth would put it. But like all too many coalitions, once they achieved their common goal, determining just what it meant became intractable.

(An aside on that growing role of Brussels. It is worth noting that the political hacks who populate the EU parliament seem to be the washed-up has-been’s and never-will-be’s of national politics who, in this country, end up in local and county races about which approximately zero-percent of population care, which allow incompetents, grafters and wing-nuts to thrive. Municipalities can cope with such characters, but it isn’t a good idea to let them run a continent. This is definite drawback of allowing the EU to gain real power incrementally.)

Brexit could have gone well. I think that is what I was, and millions of others were, thinking on that night. I assumed there would be a plan. I also, stupidly, failed to account for EU’s self-interested reaction. Each of those points deserves discussion.

Brexit shouldn’t have been disruptive, at least not as disruptive as it was planned. In my more wistful Anglophile moments back in the 90’s I envisioned the natural expansion of NAFTA to include Britain. Why not? The EU and NATO were expanding. Good international bodies seemed to need to grow. Why confine the new NAFTA agreement to just the three charter members. Sure, it could expand south, but what about east? Britain under John Major was beginning to show signs of Euro-skepticism. They hemmed at Maastricht. They hawed at the common currency. Schengen wasn’t their thing. Why wouldn’t they be receptive to an invitation to join NAFTA? I even came up with a name: Western Hemisphere Agreement on Trade, which was awkward, but would have allowed the Economist to headline an article “WHAT’s afta’ NAFTA?” Clearly, I had mental problems in my mid-20’s, but the theory seemed sound.

Twenty years later, the theory should have still been sound. Britain could have mitigated any losses from Brexit with gains from NAFTA. But the world of 2016 seemed to be turning against trade agreements. No one seems to seriously consider bringing the UK into NAFTA, nor does it seem certain that they’d have been receptive. After three years of sturm und drang associated with getting OUT of a multinational community, it is impossible to consider them joining a new one, even a much simpler one.

The lack of a plan is the most egregious facet of the entire Brexit situation. The analogy of the dog catching the car is obvious, but apt. Not unlike Republicans in 2017 realizing that they didn’t know how to repeal Obamacare, despite their promises, the Brexiteers seem to have thought that leaving the EU would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. An amicable split, not unlike giving notice and moving on to a new job. No, in a world where you need a team of lawyers to get out of a gym membership, leaving the EU was going to be complex, and anyone advocating for Brexit did a disservice to their supporters by ignoring the need for a day after plan.

Perhaps the Brexiteers thought the EU would send the UK off with a smile. After all, Britain seemed to be the odd man out since the days of Thatcher. Special rebates. Taking Masstrihct a la carte. Remaining tight with Americans. Wouldn’t the other Europeans welcome the departure of the obstreperous Brits? On an emotional level, yes. But on another, more accurate, level - no.

EU had to make it hard for Britain to leave. At least insomuch as they would have to make it difficult for anyone to leave. Once the UK sets the precedent of leaving, it becomes an option for anyone. Unhappy with this new regulation? Not satisfied with your share of the fiscal pie? Tired of begin told what to do by those mean Germans? Just threaten to leave. Or just leave without the threat. Britain did it, why can’t we? Unwilling to face that future, Britian’s soon to be ex-partners determined that Britain was going to pay, and pay hard. Any nation that ever looks to leaving the EU in the future will know that Brussels will get that pound (or two) of flesh. The fact that this stance was payback for all those years of English stubbornness as well a reasonable in terms of insuring self-preservation only sweetened the pot.

So what we seem to be left with, after more than two years of hand-wringing, is what? The Conservatives seem to be even more divided than before. One Tory government was destroyed by the vote they themselves produced, and another seems to be able to survive only because the party is incapable of selecting a new one. The Europeans are only too happy to provide exactly enough help to make the situation even more tragic. But, of course, given the vagaries of the Brexit issue, turning to the opposition does not mean a renunciation of Brexit, or even a new referendum. There can little doubt that, if nothing else, Brexit had bought the UK perilously close to a Corbyn Premiership. That alone should sober up the minds of the Tories and anyone else who cares about the future of Britain (in or out of Europe) and focus their efforts on getting a deal and moving forward. But this tragic comedy of errors, it seems, is not yet done with that Island Nation.

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First, on a very basic level, it once again underlines our commitment, as a nation, to the concept of diplomacy, international law, and the sanctity of agreements between nations. While there was and continues to be a great deal of (merited) hand-wringing and tut-tutting directed at President Trump, both before and after his election, at the dangerously ill-considered questioning of our treaty obligations to NATO as well as Japan and South Korea, the INF decision demonstrates that if an administration, even this one, determines that we are no longer served by a treaty, we will withdraw under its provisions as opposed to simply ceasing to comply. This is a direct echo of the “international pariah” Bush (43) Administration’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Note the contrast in behavior with the other signatory to the INF Treaty, Russia. For several years, we have been aware of Russian actions the ran in direct contravention of their INF obligations. Even the Obama administration, to their credit, took note of these actions and notified the Russians of our objection and willingness to take action ourselves. Considering that we are dealing with a bi-lateral treaty the terms of which the other party is no longer observing, it is to our credit that we still feel obligated to formally withdraw, rather than simply ape their behavior and cheat. It is small, but noteworthy, piece of symbolism.

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Secondly, did the INF Treaty matter anymore? Did it ever?

I subscribe to the George Will School of Arms of Control. Will has said, “Arms control is impossible until it is irrelevant.” This is an axiom that isn’t always true (I would cite the Chemical Weapons Convention as a counter-example), but often is. The INF was born at a time that, in retrospect, was the only time it COULD have been born. Vietnam, Detente, recession and who knows what else left the Untied States of the late 70’s in strategically vulnerable position. The European allies knew it, and we had to face the facts as Brezhnev began asserting Soviet power in places like Afghanistan and Poland. They also began introducing new medium range systems east of the Urals, which placed those European allies the proverbial cross-hairs. To their credit, the Carter Administration recognized this and began a major military modernization program that included the system that would become the Pershing II medium range missile. The target of this missile, so to speak, were those new Soviet forces. Not so much militarily, but as a diplomatic chip that could be bartered.

(One of my most vivid memories of my early teens from the world of international relations were the protests in Europe over the deployment of the Pershing II. Of course I didn’t know in Eighth Grade that the Germans had basically strong armed the US into even developing these missiles, and therefore the irony was lost on me.)

Enter Gorbachev and the last years of the Cold War. MMD is no fan of Gorbachev, apart from the fact that he was man enough to shut the place down without a fight, but that is for another day. Suffice it to say, Gorbachev did recognize the untenable position into which his predecessors had placed his country, and he saw his paramount responsibility as simply preserving the USSR. To do so would require help from the West, not confrontation. Certainly not a perpetual arms race, based on technology instead of overwhelming numbers, which the Soviet system was simply not capable of waging. Eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons certainly would save him money and buy some goodwill, which brought him to Reykjavik in 1986 and to sign this treaty a year later.

The US willingness to sign is easily understandable. Reagan truly believed that smart disarmament made the a nuclear exchange less likely. Domestic politics in the US and in Europe would welcome this move, after years of increasing tension. But critically, the treaty didn’t actually handicap US capabilities. Our force structure was always more reliant on the triad than the Soviets. Moreover, within the triad, ground based missiles were clearly the least important of the three legs to the planners in the Pentagon. Conversely, the Soviets were truly compromised by the treaty, but given the economic and technological hurdles in their path, they were going to be compromised regardless. So it’s easy to say that, in the late-1980’s, the INF really just formalized a situation that was going to happen of its own accord.

But there weren’t any Soviets five years later. And while the Americans could look at a Pershing II and an SS-20 at the Smithsonian and wonder what it was all about, the heirs of Soviets were bound by a treaty as well as the law of unintended consequences...

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Parte the Third. What changed?

It would be easy to write “Putin” and be done with it. But that isn’t true, at least not in the since that such a simple statement would imply.

Yes, Putin is a Russian revanchist. Yes, he seems to like nuclear backed bluster. Yes, he was forged in the kiln of East-West Conflict. Yes, he seems to have a zero-sum view of most things. And yes, Russia has been cheating on the INF treaty going back a decade. And finally, yes, when pressed on these activities, the Russian response has been that it was in response to the American decision to deploy anti-ballistic missile installations in eastern Europe. (The excuse used for so many Russian apologists for so many things.)

But the anti-missile defenses, which of course were to guard not against Russia but rather Iran, in Europe were scrapped by the Obama Administration in another reflexively anti-Bush attempt to appease Russia (and Iran) — because of course they could handle Putin better. Still, the Russians continued testing and development. Why? Actually, it has nothing to do with NATO or Bush or Obama. Rather, the new wild card is China. As much as Putin likes to bluster in the west, his real threat is China, and he knows it.

The INF only binds the US and Russia (as the successor state to the USSR). China isn’t bound by the treaty. In 1987, this wasn’t an issue. China was still an after-thought in arms control decisions. Their technology was questionable (Yes, the were launching satellites in the 90’s, but they were made of wood.) But of course China is interested in intermediate range missiles. Look at their neighborhood: Taiwan, India, US forces in Korea and Japan. And Russia. As China’s military continues to grow in size and capabilities, Russia remained bound by an INF treaty that applied as much to their eastern flank as it did to their western. Does this excuse cheating on an international treaty? No, but it does explain why.

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Lastly, symbolism versus realism.

The only thing worse than lack of an arms control agreement is an agreement that only side observes. Like it or not, Russia has effectively been out of the INF for a decade. To his credit, Obama called them on it. (Write that down. I credited Obama for doing something right.) Without a positive response from Putin, Trump has decided to leave as well. Fine. Good and valuable treaties are weakened by every one that is ignored or openly violated. It has, at least for a moment, invited a discussion about modernizing our strategic forces, most of which are in disrepair and rely on five decade old technology. We didn’t fight the Second World War with equipment from the Spanish-American War, but that simplistic analogy isn’t entirely off-base.

Those that lament the treaty’s demise were either personally invested in its creation (George Schultz) or reflexively anti-Trump (almost everyone else). They also value what the treaty REPRESENTS as opposed to what function it is still serving. It is a byproduct of the genetic blind-spot that many foreign policy professionals have for “process.” As I have said before, in an environment such as diplomacy, were real accomplishments are few and far between, simply creating a “process” can be an accomplishment itself. Treaties, which is what happens when process actually leads to something, are the crown jewel and it is easy to see why leaving them is hard to do. But sometimes it’s the right thing to do.

The anti-Trump left and never-Trump right view everything he does as failure. The diplomacy-for-diplomacy’s sake (i.e. process over results) crowd have no prospects of more working groups and multi-lats. The Subaru driving arms-control crowd and the isolationist America First’ers didn’t get whatever they wanted. Deep down, even the pro-Trump right has to question somewhere in their lizard brains why their champion was unable to make a great deal.

I will make the possibly provocative claim that this summit was a success, in spite of the efforts of President Trump and Mega Leader Kim. Or in spite of them. Even I don’t know at this point. What makes this summit a success, in my view, is that exactly nothing happened. It was entirely within Trumps ability to give away the proverbial farm in order to reach a grand bargain. To be the one who brought peace to Korea. The one who makes, as they say, the best deals. Not only was it within his ability, he even seems to be inclined towards this type of self-centered, short-sighted diplomacy. He wouldn’t be the first president to succumb to this temptation — c.f. Obama’s Iran deal and the massive pressure Clinton placed on Ehud Barack in 2000 to sign a bad treaty with Arafat for no reason other than to be the Mideast peace-broker he so desperately thought himself destined to be — but Trump seems especially wired to engage in photo-op diplomacy. I am confident that sometime before he leaves the White House, Trump will shoot for the fences in some horrible deal, just because he wants to.

But he didn’t do it this time. Yes, his statements regarding Otto Warmbier were wrong, inappropriate and unnecessarily exculpatory. Of less tragic but more strategic importance, any effort to modify-down the military cooperation between the U.S. and ROK is bad call. Even if only at a symbolic level. But does anyone doubt that it was possible, just possible, that Trump might have given much more just to get that deal? I felt there were three paths, each leading to a bad outcome, down which Trump could have gone.

The first of those paths appeals to the President’s “deal making” instincts and his seeming reliance on personal relationships. The apparent fact that he seems to have a soft spot in his heart for dictators and autocrats aside, he really seems to have taken to Kim (at least he wants the public, and Kim, to think so), and therefore he might have been inclined to give him a little something. Trump is not the first president to try to woo concessions from an autocrat through flattery. FDR certainly played the good cop to Churchill’s bad cop when dealing with “Uncle Joe.” His undoubted personal charm, which served him so well in retail politics, did not in end help a single Pole, Hungarian, Czech or Romanian remain free from Stalin’s post-war ambitions. Kim is no Stalin, but neither is Trump a Roosevelt. Flattering the Grand Leader — who is flattered in extremis everyday by everyone he encounters— is the price paid just to get a summit. (More on the tragedy of that fact below.) It will not get you concessions. And when those concessions don’t spring forth from telling Kim he’s a great guy, from giving him the positive recognition yo think he craves (because it’s what you crave), where do you go from there? What do you give him next?

The second possible path, and none of these are mutually exclusive, was made possible only by domestic U.S. politics. It is, of course, the tried-and-true political tactic of distraction. Wouldn’t it have been plausible that the President might have taken the opportunity to grab headlines with a major agreement in order to push the Michael Cohen testimony off the front page? Would that have been an unprecedented move? How many Sudanese aspirin factories, Iraqi anti-aircraft facilitates and tents in the Afghan desert had to be destroyed to distract us from Ken Starr’s investigation? Trump and Clinton, in my view, are probably on about equal moral footing, so I guess I should be surprised that Trump didn’t offer the Maximum Leader the opportunity to host the next season of The Apprentice. (As an aside, the irony here is that many pro-Trump pundits conjectured that the Cohen hearings were scheduled with the intention of pushing any potential U.S.-DPRK agreement out of the headlines. And I doubt there’s anything in the world that would have compelled CNN to cover the summit even if Trump and Kim held hands and ascended to Heaven.)

And, regrettably, there is the third possible path: Kim could have simply outsmarted Trump. I am not saying this as some sort of rabid anti-Trumper. Rather, simply out of a concern that the President hasn’t shown a great command of international relations, motivations, agendas (open or hidden) or the desire and aims of other countries. Put simply, Trump is like the vast majority of Americans who simply never felt a need to care about the world beyond a vague recognition that there are, allegedly, other countries. What does a New York real estate developer and TV personality need to know about the intricacies of Northeast Asian politics? Frankly, what do most ex-governors and senators know about such things? (Off the top of my head, I can think of only four or five presidents that had a serious knowledge (beyond a guiding philosophy, that is) of foreign affairs prior to election, let alone interest: Bush I, Nixon, maybe Eisenhower, Theodore Roosevelt and maybe Jefferson. Any argument?) The difference is, most presidents are career politicians. And more than most, they recognize (1) the importance of not committing on an issue they know they don’t know and (2) being smart enough not to give away anything without getting something in return. You’d think the author of the “Art of the Deal” would also know that, and maybe down deep he does.

So, it’s fair to say, there were plenty of ways in which this summit could have led to a bad, if not disastrous, deal. But it didn’t. And in that way, I count it as a success, even if a small one. But, in a peculiar way, it is a success in exactly the same way our Korea policy has been a success since 1953. Yes, a success. A success insomuch as this is one of those seeming insoluble problems of diplomacy, like the Arab-Israeli conflict but with nukes. For four decades Korea was subsumed in the context of the Cold War. The Soviets and the PRC restrained the North while we rebuilt the South. The DPRK was just another communist client state that represented no more of an independent threat than Bulgaria, whose main export was comically over-the-top propaganda that made the East Germany Ministry of Information look like C-SPAN. Things might have changed with the demise of the Soviet Union, but the Kims seemed to have learned a lesson from 1989. Rather than becoming the Asian East Germany, as so many expected, Kim Il-Song doubled-down on repression coupled with a belief that nuclear weapons were the best guarantor of independence. Kim Jog-Il let it ride for 20 years, as Clinton and then Bush both waited for the whole thing to implode, hoping only that that implosion wouldn’t take Seoul with it.

The Kims’ bet paid off. And while the U.S. and our allies avoided tragedy, at least for now, we seem to have reaped a Catch-22. The Kim’s aren’t crazy. Rather, they seem to have mastered the art of brinkmanship. Every few years, conventional saber rattling, self-imposed human suffering on their population and the threat of a refugee crisis or by simply floating the possibility of peace, the regime new it could wring concessions from their adversaries (or allies, even). All the while, despite sanctions. Despite international isolation. Despite the concerted and sincere efforts of four consecutive U.S. administrations. Despite everything, they achieved their goal of obtaining an independent nuclear deterrent. So long as those weapons exist, and so long as they restrain their own actions, the gang in Pyongyang do not need to fear an attack from the south. The regime may yet collapse, but such a collapse will be slow and from the inside.

An that is where this summit, even if it was a success when viewed in a diplomatic vacuum, is still part of a larger failure. As shown above, we were unable (or, more accurately, unwilling) to take the steps that would have denied the DPRK their nuclear ambitions. Considering those steps carried the risk of a full-scale war, conventional but none the less catastrophic, that path might have been the best option. But it was always in our power to deny them their political ambitions. So long as the North remained the Hermit Kingdom, and their international recognition was confined to Beijing, Havana and other misfit states and communist anachronisms, we denied the Kims the legitimacy they craved. But Trump gave them that last year. For nothing. Only vague promises to stop nuclear testing and strive for a “denuclearized” Korean peninsula, which from their point of means a peninsula free of Americans. Worse than playing tippy-toe with Putin. Worse than idiotic trade policies. Worse than ill-considered withdrawals from Syria and Afghanistan. Worse than haranguing our allies. Those policies can, possibly, be reverse. This can not. A seismic geopolitical shift in U.S. policy in favor of an adversarial nuclear power. The nuclear power that seems most likely to use that power. And Trump gave them the one thing that they most wanted and would never be able to achieve on their own — legitimacy. And this summit was a success simply because he didn’t give them more - the bar was that low.

Perhaps Trump has learned his lesson regarding the DPRK. Perhaps not. But at least we seem to be off the path to disaster, for now.